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INHERITANCE, THE SHARE OF THE SURVIVING
SPOUSE, AND WILLS: ARKANSAS LAW AND THE
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE COMPARED
Ellen B. Brantley* and Richard W. Effland**
In its 1979 Session, the Arkansas General Assembly considered
a bill (H.B. 169) which provided for the enactment of the Uniform
Probate Code in Arkansas. The bill was a product of a commission,
appointed by former Governor David Pryor, which studied the
Code, amended some of its provisions, and drafted the bill to enact
it. The bill was considered in Committee and on the floor of the
House of Representatives, and was referred to the Joint Interim
Committee on the Judiciary for consideration before the next regu-
lar session of the Assembly commencing in January 1981. Because
of the pendency of this matter, the authors believed that a section
by section comparison between the Uniform Probate Code and Ar-
kansas law would be useful to lawyers, legislators, and others inter-
ested in probate law.
The article compares the Code, as embodied in H.B. 169, with
existing Arkansas law in the areas of intestate succession, the share
of the surviving spouse, and wills. The Code, and H.B. 169, cover
many other areas as well, e.g., the administration of decedents'
estates, guardianship, survivorship accounts. The fact that these
provisions are not covered in this article is not because they are
unimportant.
However, a section by section comparison of the entire Code
would be too lengthy for this article. Moreover, much of the con-
troversy surrounding the enactment of the Code, both in Arkansas
and elsewhere, has focused on the changes, both substantive and
procedural, which the Code would make in the law of inheritance.
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And, while the authors believe that enactment of the Code at
one time is preferable, they also believe, should that prove impos-
sible, that enactment of portions of the Code could be desirable. If
the "piecemeal" approach is adopted, the substantive law of inher-
itance treated in this article seems a good place to begin.
INTESTATE SUCCESSION
The goal of any intestate law should be to distribute the dece-
dent's property as he or she would have distributed it by will.
However, if one assumes that for purposes of notice and adminis-
trative convenience, one fixed scheme of intestate distribution is
necessary, this scheme must be designed to effectuate the intent of
the "average" intestate.' No state legislature has, so far as can be
determined, made an attempt to ascertain this intent by empirical
evidence. Indeed, there is a dearth of such evidence.2 A large per-
centage of decedents die intestate. Perhaps this reflects general
satisfaction with the intestate laws. On the other hand, several
studies of the dispositions by will made by decedents indicate that
a scheme quite different from that of the intestate laws of most
American jurisdictions is usually followed.2 Assuming, as seems
reasonable, that there is not likely to be a wide divergence of dis-
tributive desires between those who make a will and those who do
not, these studies indicate that major changes, particularly in the
share to be allocated to the surviving spouse, need to be made in
the intestate laws of most jurisdictions.
1. It would theoretically be possible to allow a judicial determination of how an intes-
tate's property should be distributed, but no American jurisdiction has chosen to do so.
England's Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act, 1975, c. 63 gives the
court full authority to make provisions for the decedent's family from the estate without
specifying any particular manner of distribution.
2. A recent public opinion survey on the desired distribution of property after death
was reported in the American Bar Foundation Research Journal; the results of earlier
surveys of testamentary disposition are summarized in the same article. Fellows, Simon &
Rau, Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession
Laws in the United States, 1978 Am. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 319.
3. In a study of wills probated in Cook County, Illinois, every decedent willed his or
her entire estate to a surviving spouse, including situations in which the decedent had chil-
dren. Dunham, The Method, Process, and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30




Share of the Surviving Spouse
U.P.C. §§ 2-102; 2-103; 2-105; 2-106
Ark. §§ 61-149; 61-150; 61-201; 61-202; 61-203; 61-204; 61-206;
61-228
The Uniform Probate Code (hereinafter "U.P.C."), with a refer-
ence in the Comments to the fact that most wills of married per-
sons leave the surviving spouse substantially more than the intes-
tate laws, provides a larger share for the surviving spouse than do
the laws of most American jurisdictions, including Arkansas.4
1. When Decedent is also Survived by Issue
If the issue who survived the decedent are also children of the
surviving spouse, the U.P.C. gives the surviving spouse $50,000
plus one-half of the remainder of the estate.5 If the issue are issue
of a previous marriage, the surviving spouse receives only one-half
of the estate.' These provisions contrast not only with the typical
intestate statutes, which provide a smaller share, typically one-
third, but also with the results of the empirical studies which indi-
cate that virtually all testators leave their entire estate to the sur-
viving spouse.7 However, because the spouse, in the case where all
surviving children are children of the marriage, receives allowances
and exempt property as well as the first $50,000, he or she receives
the entire estate if the estate is under approximately $63,500.
The U.P.C. simplifies the intestate scheme by creating no dis-
tinctions based on the sex of the surviving spouse, the fact the
property is real or personal, or the source of the property. In con-
trast, Arkansas has a highly complex scheme for calculating the
share of the surviving spouse. Arkansas allots only a small share to
the spouse, if the children survive. When the decedent is survived
by children, the surviving spouse is not even an "heir" under the
Arkansas Table of Descent and Distribution, but takes only dower
or curtesy.8 Dower and curtesy have been statutorily modified in
Arkansas. Where the decedent leaves children, dower in land gives
a surviving wife a life interest in one-third of all real estate the
decedent owned during the marriage and one-third in fee simple of
4. U.P.C. § 2-102, Comment.
5. Id. § 2-102(3).
6. Id. § 2-102(4).
7. See note 3 supra.
8. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-149 (1971).
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all personal property which he owned at death. 9 Curtesy provides
the same share if the decedent wife is survived by issue.' The in-
adequacy of these shares is manifest not only by comparison with
the testamentary schemes adopted by those who make wills, but
also by the fact that these same shares are the non-barrable share
allocated a spouse."' Surely a statute which presumes the average
intestate would wish to leave his or her spouse the absolute mini-
mum the law allows is not in accord with the intent of most
persons.
2. When the Decedent is not Survived by Issue
If the decedent is not survived by issue, but does leave par-
ents, the U.P.C. gives the spouse $50,000 plus one-half the re-
mainder, with the remaining property to the surviving parents or
parent.1' If there is no surviving parent, the surviving spouse takes
the entire estate. '8 The share allocated to the parents, which is the
same as that allocated to children, has been criticized.1 4 On an ad
hoc basis, it is much more difficult to justify the assumption that
the "average" decedent would wish his parents to take a portion of
his property in preference to his or her spouse than the assumption
that he or she might desire his or her children to do so.15
In Arkansas the scheme for distribution is very complex where
the decedent leaves a surviving spouse but no issue. The dower and
curtesy statutes provide a different share for the surviving spouse
where there are no surviving issue of the decedent. A widow re-
ceives an absolute interest in one-half of real estate, provided it is
a new acquisition, and one-half of personalty. These proportions
are against other heirs; her share is reduced to one-third as against
creditors. In ancestral real property, the widow takes a life estate
in one-half of the property. Again, this share is only one-third vis a
9. Id. §§ 61-201 (land), -202 (personal property).
10. Id. § 61-228.
11. Id. § 60-501. Note that there is no elective share for a surviving husband except
where the wife's will was written before their marriage.
12. U.P.C. § 2-102(2).
13. Id. § 2-102(1).
14. See, e.g., Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process: The Surviv-
ing Spouse, Year's Support and Intestate Succession, 10 GA. L. REv. 447, 454 (1976).
15. It is interesting to note that the first three working drafts of the Uniform Probate
Code did not contain this provision; instead, the surviving spouse would have taken the
entire estate in preference to the decedent's parents, unless the surviving spouse had been
married to the decedent for less than one year.
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vis creditors.' The curtesy statute provides a slightly different
scheme for a surviving husband. He receives an absolute interest in
one-half of personalty and realty which is a "new acquisition." He
receives a life interest in one-third of ancestral property.'7 These
shares apply against collateral heirs. Against creditors, the hus-
band receives a life estate in one-third of all realty and an absolute
interest in one-third of personalty.
Additionally, the surviving spouse is also an heir under the
Table of Descent and Distribution and will take a share in addition
to dower or curtesy. Where the surviving spouse and the decedent
have been married for three years or more, the surviving spouse
takes the entire estate.' 8 Where the couple was married less than
three years, the surviving spouse takes one-half of the remainder of
the estate, with the other one-half going to surviving parents or
parent or, if none, to the decedent's brothers and sisters or their
descendants. In the absence of such takers, the remainder of the
estate would descend to collateral relatives, as described in the
next section." If there are no descendants entitled to take, the sur-
viving spouse, though married to the decedent for less than three
years, will take in preference to escheat."
This terribly elaborate scheme of dower and curtesy is not
often used since calculation is necessary only when the decedent
leaves no issue, but does leave a surviving spouse to whom he or
she has been married for less than three years. Nevertheless, it is
cumbersome and clearly does not comport with the intent of the
average decedent in that it allows even a very distant relative to
receive a portion of the estate in preference to a surviving spouse
of less than three years. Even if the ultimate result is accept-
able-the entire estate to a surviving spouse if there are no chil-
dren and the couple has been married for at least three years-it
would be preferable to reach that result more simply.
3. When the Decedent Leaves No Surviving Spouse
U.P.C. § 2-103
Ark. § 61-149
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-206 (1971).
17. Id. § 61-228.
18. Id. § 61-149(b).
19. Id. § 61-149.
20. Id. § 61-150.
1980] 365
UALR LAW JOURNAL
The U.P.C., like existing law in every jurisdiction, provides for
succession of the entire estate to the decedent's issue where the
decedent leaves no surviving spouse.21 Arkansas has the same pro-
vision.23 Where the decedent leaves no issue, the U.P.C. provides
for inheritance by the decedent's parents, or, if only one parent
survives, by that parent .' Arkansas law follows the same pattern.'
The next takers under the U.P.C. are "the issue of the parents,"
i.e., brothers and sisters of the decedent, including half brothers or
half sisters;" the next takers under current Arkansas law are
"brothers and sisters" of the intestate and their descendants, 6
which produces the same distributive scheme.
Where the intestate is not survived by parents, brothers or sis-
ters, or the issue of brothers and sisters, Arkansas and the U.P.C
part company. The U.P.C. provides that one-half of the estate goes
to surviving grandparents or their issue on the maternal side, and
one-half to these relations on the paternal side. If there are no col-
laterals of this degree on one side, the entire estate goes to the side
which has such relatives.' 7 In the same situation Arkansas law pro-
vides for inheritance by "surviving grandparents, uncles and
aunts."'28 The difference between the two schemes can be illus-
trated by an example. Decedent dies, leaving only a first cousin on
the maternal side and a grandmother and three great aunts on the
paternal side. Under the U.P.C., the first cousin (issue of a grand-
parent) receives one-half of the estate, and the paternal grand-
mother receives the other one-half. Under current Arkansas law,
each survivor would receive one-fifth.
While there is no evidence as to which scheme the "average"
intestate would prefer, it seems fair to hypothesize that the aver-
age testator would prefer grandparents to more remote relatives
such as aunts and cousins. Therefore, the U.P.C. scheme is prob-
ably preferable. In fact, the Arkansas scheme is highly unusual in
that it allows more remote relatives (uncles and aunts) to inherit
along with living relatives closer in degree (grandparents). 9
21. U.P.C. § 2-103(1).
22. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-149(a) (1971).
23. U.P.C. § 2-103(2), (3).
24. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-149(d) (1971).
25. U.P.C. § 2-103(3).
26. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-149(e) (1971).
27. U.P.C. § 2-103(4).
28. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-149(f) (1971).
29. T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THz LAW OF WILLS § 16 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter
[Vol. 3:361
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If there are no grandparents or issue of grandparents, the
property will escheat under the U.P.C.30 Under Arkansas law, the
property will pass next to great grandparents and great aunts and
great uncles, using the same distributive scheme. Each member of
the class receives an equal share, as in the case of inheritance by
"grandparents, uncles and aunts."31 The same criticism-that this
approach treats more distant relatives equally with closer rela-
tives-is applicable here. If there are no heirs of this class, under
Arkansas law the property will pass to the surviving spouse of less
than three years. If there is no surviving spouse, the property
passes to the "heirs, determined as of the date of the Intestate's
death . . . of the Intestate's deceased spouse. . . ." before
escheat.3'
Both the Arkansas and the U.P.C. approaches represent a ma-
jor change from common law in that they cut off inheritance at
some degree. At common law, any relative of the decedent, no mat
ter how distant, was allowed to inherit before escheat. There was
also no provision for inheritance by relatives of the spouse.
Both the U.P.C. and Arkansas schemes solve the major
problems of unlimited inheritance: the expense and difficulty of lo-
cating more remote relatives, the possibility of frivolous litigation
contesting the will by "laughing heirs," and the administrative
problems which could be caused by division of the estate into small
portions. The U.P.C. provision, by limiting inheritance to grand-
parents and their descendants, goes further than Arkansas. Per-
haps in today's society it is unlikely that family ties will be strong
with more remote relatives or with relatives of the spouse, except
perhaps the spouse's parents, brothers and sisters. To the extent
this is true, the U.P.C. provision would also be more in keeping
with the intent of the "average" testator. The U.P.C. would pro-
vide for escheat to the state more frequently, but in a society
where the state is far more likely to provide care than remote rela-
tives, this may be more appropriate.
Per Capita/Per Stirpes
The intestate statutes provide for inheritance by certain
cited as ATIUNSON].
30. U.P.C. § 2-105.
31. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-149(0, (g) (1971).
32. Id. §§ 61-149(h), -150.
1980] 367
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classes such as "brothers and sisters" or "children." When a mem-
ber of a class designated as the recipient of decedent's property
predeceases the decedent, but leaves descendants, the descendants
may, under both the U.P.C. and current Arkansas law, share in the
estate. 3 For example, if an intestate dies survived by one child and
two grandchildren who are children of a predeceased child of the
intestate, those grandchildren would take a portion of the estate
under the U.P.C. and Arkansas law. 4
The shares of those relatives who take "by representation" are
computed in one of two ways: per stirpes or per capita. Per stir-
pes, literally by stocks, means that the class which takes by repre-
sentation takes the share that the ancestor they represent would
have taken. In the above example, the two grandchildren take to-
gether one-half, which is the share that would have been taken by
their parent.
Under a "pure" per stirpes distribution, the estate is divided
at the level of children with a share for each child and a share for
each predeceased child who leaves descendants. This division
seems appropriate in some cases, but it can cause anomalous re-
sults. Suppose that the intestate is survived by nine grandchildren,
one of whom is the child of a predeceased daughter, and eight of
whom are the children of a predeceased son. Under pure per stir-
pes, the child of the predeceased daughter would receive one-half
of the estate and the other eight grandchildren would receive one-
sixteenth each. This result strikes most observers as unlikely to be
in accordance with the intestate's wishes."
Neither Arkansas nor the U.P.C. use the pure per stirpes
method. Instead, both use a modified per stirpes system.5 6 Under
33. This is called the doctrine of representation. The descendants of the class member
who predeceased the intestate "represent" their ancestor in inheritance.
34. U.P.C. § 2-103; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-134, -135, -149 (1971).
35. Additional support for this view can be found in the survey of people's wishes in
regard to disposition of their estates conducted by Fellows, Simon, and Rau. When respon-
dents were asked how they would like their property distributed if they were survived only
by three grandchildren, one of whom was the child of a deceased son, and the other two the
children of another deceased son, 94.9% wished each of the three grandchildren to take Vs
of the estate. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 2, at 382-83.
36. Technically, under both Arkansas law and the Uniform Probate Code, the heirs
take per capita if they are all related to the decedent in the same degree; if they are related
in unequal degrees, those who are related in the closest degree will take per capita, those in
more remote degrees, per stirpes. These more remote heirs who are to inherit per stirpes
are taking as representatives of an ancestor who would have been an heir had he survived;
they may be related to their ancestor in unequal degrees. If so, they inherit under the same
368 [Vol. 3:361
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this system, the estate is divided into shares at the first level at
which a taker survives. In the above example, it would not be di-
vided at the level of the children, because no children survived the
decedent. Instead, it would be divided at the level of grandchildren
so that each grandchild would receive one-ninth of the estate. The
rationale for this approach is that it is more likely the intestate
would want to treat relatives of the same degree equally, than that
he would want the results under a pure per stirpes distribution.
The modified per stirpes system does solve some of the
problems of pure per stirpes distribution, but a similar difficulty
can still arise. For example, suppose the decedent were survived by
a son and by nine grandchildren, one the child of a deceased
daughter, and eight the children of a deceased son. Even under
modified per stirpes, the estate is divided at the level of children,
so the son takes one-third, the child of the deceased daughter
takes one-third, and the children of the deceased son take one-
twenty-fourth each. It has been suggested that a scheme should be
adopted which would give the son one-third and divide the remain-
ing two-thirds equally among the other takers.
3 7
The principle of representation also applies when property is
inherited by collateral relatives. For example, if an intestate is sur-
vived only by two brothers and two nieces, the daughters of a de-
ceased brother, each brother would take one-third and the nieces
would take by representation the one-third of the estate which
their deceased father would have received. These results would be
the same under both the U.P.C. and Arkansas law.
In a situation in which the intestate is not survived by parents
or brothers or sisters (or their issue), current Arkansas law and the
U.P.C. produce different results. Under these circumstances, Ar-
kansas's intestate statute provides for inheritance by "grandpar-
scheme-if they are related in equal degrees, per capita; if not, those in the closer degree,
per capita, those in a more remote degree, per stirpes.
37. This suggestion was advocated by Professor Lawrence A. Waggoner in his article,
A Proposed Alternative to the Uniform Probate Code System for Intestate Distribution
Among Descendants, 66 Nw. U. L. Rav. 626 (1971). The Comments to § 2-103 of the 1977
edition of the Code report that a majority of the Joint Editorial Board favored changing the
Code to incorporate this suggestion, but that others objected on the ground that a change in
the original text, already adopted in several states, would weaken the uniformity of the
enactments of the Code. However, since several states had already enacted statutes designed
to implement the Code with deviations from the suggested language, Professor Waggoner's
proposed alternative is included in the Comments. The Committee which drafted the bill to
enact the Uniform Probate Code in Arkansas did not adopt this suggestion.
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ents, uncles, and aunts. ' ' " As discussed above, this is a somewhat
unusual situation since Anglo-American inheritance law usually
does not provide for inheritance by the descendants of a living
heir.3 ' The U.P.C., using the modified per stirpes system men-
tioned above, provides for distribution only to grandparents, if liv-
ing; aunts and uncles take only as representatives of predeceased
grandparents of the intestate. It is difficult to understand exactly
why the Arkansas statutory pattern was selected, or to argue for
it.'0 The U.P.C. pattern not only seems more likely to comport
with a decedent's wishes, but also is consistent with the general
pattern of distribution, which allows inheritance by lineals or more
closely related collaterals.
To summarize, the U.P.C. provisions for a "modified" per stir-
pes system would not change the pattern of inheritance under cur-
rent Arkansas law when the heirs are lineal descendants. When
there are no lineal descendants and inheritance is by collateral rel-
atives, the U.P.C. would change existing law. Under the Code,
grandparents would succeed to the estate in preference to aunts
and uncles. This seems more likely to effectuate the average intes-
tate's intent.
Problems of Status
1. Relatives of the Half Blood
U.P.C. § 2-107
Ark. § 61-145
The U.P.C. specifically provides that no distinction is made
between relatives of the whole blood and relatives of the half
blood.' For example, a half sister would be treated exactly as a
full sister for all inheritance purposes. Arkansas's statute, while
38. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-149(f) (1971). Note that in situations in which the intestate
is survived by neither parents, siblings, grandparents, aunts or uncles, inheritance is by
"great grandparents and great uncles and great aunts." Id. § 61-149(g) (1971).
39. Page, Descent Per Stirpes and Per Capita, 1946 Wis. L. RaV. 3, 12. See also the
discussion at note 29, supra.
40. In his article, The New Arkansas Inheritance Laws: A Step into the Present with
an Eye to the Future, 23 ARK. L. Rzv. 313, 347 (1969), Professor Robert R. Wright indicates
that the 1969 revision of the statute of descent and distribution merely clarified existing
law. He later comments on the difference between Arkansas law and the Code, "it would
seem that the U.P.C. is correct. An intestate is generally more likely to bear a close relation-
ship with his grandparents than with his uncles and aunts." Id. at 348.
41. U.P.C. § 2-107. Relatives of the half blood are persons with whom the decedent
shares one common ancestor, i.e., half brothers or half sisters and their descendants.
[Vol. 3:361
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worded somewhat differently, has similar provisions.42 Both are in
contrast to the common law position, which excluded half blooded
relatives completely,48 and to the several later methods of inheri-
tance devised in American jurisdictions. These methods included
(1) allowing inheritance by relations of the half blood, but giving
them only one-half the share of a full blooded relative of the same
degree," or (2) allowing inheritance by half bloods, but "demoting"
them. Under the latter plan, a half blooded relative would be ex-
cluded by a whole blooded relative of the same degree but would
take in preference to a whole blooded relative of a lesser degree.4'
It is difficult to determine which treatment of half blooded rel-
atives is likely to effectuate the "average" intestate's intentions.
Where the intestate and a half blooded sibling have been reared in
the same household, it seems likely that a family relationship very
much like whole blooded siblings would result. In other situations,
the half blooded relative may have had little actual relationship
with the intestate. Since disposition by will can always accommo-
date differing situations, the approach taken by the U.P.C. and





The U.P.C. provides that all "relatives" of the decedent con-
ceived, though unborn, at his death will share in the estate as if
they had been born before his death. 7 Under Arkansas law, only
"descendants" conceived before the intestate's death may inherit
as posthumous heirs; therefore, if collateral relatives are the heirs,
only those born at the time of the intestate's death may receive the
property.'8
The situations in which this distinction is critical are few,
since if the parents of the unborn child are alive, the one related to
the intestate will be the heir. However, it could make a difference
42. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-145 (1971).
43. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 8.
44. Id. § 19.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. U.P.C. § 2-108.
48. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-142 (1971).
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in a limited number of cases. For example, suppose the intestate
were survived by a niece, the daughter of a deceased sister, and
that at the time of his death, the widow of the decedent's brother
was pregnant. Under current Arkansas law, the niece would inherit
to the exclusion of the unborn child of the intestate's brother who
would be of the same degree of relationship to the intestate. Under
the U.P.C., the niece and the unborn niece or nephew would share
equally.
There appears to be no reason to exclude such an unborn
child. Since distribution of the estate will almost surely take longer
than gestation, there is no administrative problem in his or her
inclusion. Arkansas law already extends inheritance to a posthu-
mous descendant and there seems to be no rationale for treating
posthumous collateral relatives differently from posthumous de-
scendants. Adoption of the U.P.C. provision would place Arkansas
in line with the majority of American jurisdictions.
3. Adoption
U.P.C. § 2-109; 2-113
Ark. §§ 56-201 to -221
In its definition of "child," the U.P.C. follows the modern
trend by treating an adopted child precisely the same as a natural
child. Under the U.P.C., the adopted child not only inherits from
both adoptive parents but also "through" them, and they inherit
from him. Moreover, all ties with the natural parents are severed
and the child neither inherits from or through them nor do they
inherit from him.'0
Arkansas has adopted the Revised Uniform Adoption Act.'
This statute is a comprehensive adoption statute which includes
procedural provisions for adoption. Section 56-215 governs the ef-
fect of adoption on inheritance and provides that an adopted child
is treated the same as a natural child for all inheritance purposes.
Under this statute, a final decree of adoption terminates all legal
relationship between the adopted child and his natural parents
"for all purposes including inheritance." This creates the relation-
ship of parent and child between the adopted child and the adop-
tive parents "as if the adopted child were a legitimate blood de-
49. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 16.
50. U.P.C. § 2-109.
51. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-201 to -221. (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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scendant of the petitioner (adoptive parent), for all purposes
including inheritance ... .
Both statutes represent a great change from the common law,
which did not recognize adoption, 8 and from intermediate statu-
tory treatments of adoption. These statutes often permitted inheri-
tance from the adoptive parents to the child; some allowed inheri-
tance "through" them while others did not." Moreover, the
adopted child frequently could also inherit from his natural par-
ents.' The rights of inheritance from an adopted child were often
governed by the source of the property." Both Arkansas and the
U.P.C., in treating the adopted child as a natural child, have elimi-
nated the problems these statutes often caused, and have, it seems
clear, brought the inheritance laws in this area into line with the
intent of the average intestate.57
Although the Arkansas statute and the U.P.C. would reach the
same result in almost every case, there is one possible area of dif-
ference. Under the U.P.C., if the spouse of one natural parent
adopts the child, the adoption does not affect the parental rela-
tionship with the other natural parent." In Arkansas, adoption by
the spouse of a natural parent will sever the parental relationship
with the other parent except where the adoption occurs after the
death of the other natural parent." For example, if the natural
parents of a child divorce, the wife remarries, and her husband
adopts the child during the lifetime of the natural father in a
U.P.C. jurisdiction, the child would still inherit from and through
the natural father, and the natural father from him. In Arkansas,
this would not be the case.
As a practical matter, adoption by the spouse of a natural par-
ent during the lifetime of the other natural parent is somewhat
52. Id. § 56-215.
53. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 23.
54. Binavince, Adoption and the Law of Descent and Distribution: A Comparative
Study and a Proposal for Model Legislation, 51 CORNw.L L. Q. 152 (1966).
55. Comment, The Adopted Child's Inheritance from Intestate Natural Parents, 55
IOWA L. REv. 739 (1970).
56. Binavince, supra note 54, at 165.
57. While there appears to be no empirical study establishing the intention of the av-
erage intestate to have his property pass to adopted persons, whether adopted by him or by
another, or to his adoptive parents or their heirs, this assumption underlies the whole recent
trend in American jurisdictions to put the adopted child in the same position as the natural
child.
58. U.P.C. § 2-109(1). See also Comment.
59. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-215(2)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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rare, since, except in the case of illegitimacy, it requires abandon-
ment or nonsupport of the child, the consent of the other natural
parent, or a proceeding for termination of parental status." None-
theless, it does happen. Where it does happen it seems that the
Arkansas position, terminating parental rights of the natural par-
ent who does not support his child, who consents to adoption, or
whose parental rights are legally terminated, is appropriate. He or
she has relinquished his status as a parent and there seems to be
no reason to allow inheritance. Of course in the case of adoption by
the spouse of the natural parent after the death of the other natu-
ral parent, inheritance can only be through the deceased parent.
This seems correct, in that the family relationship with relatives of
the deceased natural parent is likely to continue. Therefore, Ar-
kansas's existing law in this area, which has only recently been re-
vised, seems preferable to the U.P.C. and ought to be retained.61
The U.P.C. contains a related provision which is devised to
handle the situation in which a person is adopted by a relative. 2 It
provides that a person related to a decedent through two lines re-
ceives only a single share of the estate. This share is based on
whichever relationship is closer. The comments to the U.P.C. indi-
cate that this provision is designed to apply in the case where the
brother or sister of a decedent marries the decedent's spouse and
adopts his or her child. If the adoptive parent dies, the adopted
child would be both the natural and the adopted grandchild of the





The U.P.C. essentially treats an illegitimate child as the child
of both its mother and father for all inheritance purposes. In this
respect, it is a major innovation. Common law treated the illegiti-
60. Id. §§ 56-206 to -207.
61. The proposed bill to enact the Code does not contain a specific repealer for any
portion of existing law. Presumably ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-215 (Cum. Supp. 1979) would be
repealed as inconsistent. The proposed bill could be altered by either omitting any reference
in regard to adopted children or by stating in U.P.C. § 2-109 that inheritance rights are
governed by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-215 (Cum. Supp. 1979).




mate as filius nullius (the child of no one), and he could not in-
herit from or through either parent, nor could anyone inherit from
him." In all American jurisdictions, that rule has been modified; in
general, the illegitimate is able to inherit from and through his
mother, but may be limited in his right to inherit from and/or
through his father." The U.P.C. provides that for inheritance pur-
poses, an illegitimate child is the child of both mother and father,
and that parentage should be established by the Uniform Parent-
age Act.
Few states, however, have adopted the Uniform Parentage
Act,"' so the U.P.C. provides an alternative for states which have
not. Under this alternative, the illegitimate is the child of the
mother and may inherit from and through her; he is also the child
of the father if the parents "participate in a marriage ceremony
before or after the child's birth," or if an adjudication of paternity
is made before or after the father's death. 07 A second provision in
this alternative is that in order for the father or his kin to inherit
from or through the child, the father must have "treated the child
as his own" and "not refused" to support him." The Arkansas
Committee on the U.P.C. proposed this alternative provision in the
bill that it presented to the legislature.
At the time the Committee met, this provision was a signifi-
cant change from existing Arkansas law. However, in the case of
Trimble v. Gordon," the United States Supreme Court invalidated
a statute similar to Arkansas's. The statute considered in Trimble
limited the inheritance rights of illegitimates to cases where the
parents participated in a void ceremony before birth, or where the
parents married after the child's birth and the father recognized
the child. In the wake of Trimble, the 1979 Arkansas legislature
amended the statute. The amendment left intact the earlier provi-
sion legitimizing the children of void marriages and children whose
parents later marry and who are recognized by the father. It added
provisions allowing an illegitimate to inherit from and through his
father if there is (1) an adjudication of paternity, (2) a written ac-
64. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 6.
65. J. RrrCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EmAD, CASES AND MAT ERULS ON Du cErs'
EsTATES AND TRUSTS 71-72 (5th ed. 1977).
66. Seven states have adopted the Act. 9A UNoJRu LAws ANNOTATE 579 (1979).
67. U.P.C. § 2-109(2) (alternative subsection).
68. Id. § 2-109(2)(ii).
69. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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knowledgment by the father or his written consent to entry of his
name on the child's birth certificate, (3) intermarriage by the par-
ents prior to the child's birth or attempt to do so but the marriage
"is or could be declared invalid", or (4) an obligation of the father
to support the child by written promise or court order.7
The new Arkansas statute, apparently drafted in haste, has
some problems. Subsections (d) (4) and (5) of section 61-141 which
provide for inheritance if the parents "intermarry prior to the
birth of the child" or if they attempt "to marry each other prior to'
the birth of the child by a marriage solemnized in apparent com-
pliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be
declared invalid," seem to duplicate unrepealed section (a) of the
same statute. There are, however, minor changes in wording. De-
spite the drafting problems, some of the provisions, such as legiti-
mation by written acknowledgment or by the father's consent to
entry of his name on the birth certificate, which are designed to
allow inheritance without a court proceeding for legitimation may
be an improvement over the U.P.C. In light of the new law in this
area, the U.P.C. provision could well be revised to incorporate
some of the provisions of current Arkansas law. Another and per-
haps preferable alternative is the adoption of the Revised Uniform




The U.P.C. adopts the simple principle that a person's right to
inherit property is not affected by his status as an alien.7 1 Arkansas
law as amended in 1969 also makes alienage irrelevant to inheri-
tance.72 Both statutes represent a change in the common law posi-
tion which classified persons as "friendly" or "enemy" aliens and
restricted the rights of "enemy" aliens to inherit property.73 They
also are in contrast to laws which have been passed in a number of
jurisdictions restricting the rights of aliens unless the alien's coun-
try grants "reciprocal" inheritance rights to U.S. citizens or re-
stricting the rights unless the alien can establish that he personally
70. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
71. U.P.C. § 2-112.
72. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-143 (1971).
73. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 10.
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will have the benefit of the property.7 4
There are significant differences in drafting in the two stat-
utes. Arkansas law speaks not only of the right to inherit, but also
of the right to transmit by inheritance. The U.P.C. refers only to
the right to inherit. Reference to the right to transmit seems un-
necessary, as there has never been any restriction of the right of an
alien to transmit property by inheritance.
The U.P.C. also provides that no one is disqualified if he
claims through an alien. Arkansas does not have such a provision,
and while no litigation has arisen over the question, the U.P.C.




The U.P.C. adds to the law of intestate succession the provi-
sion often found in wills that an heir must survive the decedent for
a specified time period before he can inherit. The U.P.C. provides
that any person who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours is
treated as having predeceased him.7 ' The provision is useful for
several reasons. First, when two closely related persons such as
husband and wife die in the same occurrence, inheritance will de-
pend on who died first. In order to determine this, all kinds of
evidence bearing on who died first will be relevant, including medi-
cal evidence and expert testimony about the occurrence. Involved
and expensive litigation can easily result. Second, once the order of
death is determined, the property of the person who died first will
have to be administered twice: first in his estate, then in the estate
of the heir. Third, unintended results often occur. For example, if
a husband and wife die in a car wreck and it is determined that the
wife survived, though only by seconds, the husband's property
passes to her, then through her estate to her heirs, rather than to
his heirs.
Arkansas, like a number of states, has already attempted to
deal with the problem by enacting the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act.7' Unfortunately, the Act doesn't adequately solve all of
these problems. It is limited to cases where death is "simultane-
74. See note 65 supra, at 113.
75. U.P.C. § 2-104.
76. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-124 (1971).
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ous." Therefore, in a case where there is any evidence about time
of death, the problems remain.
The U.P.C. provision solves these problems to a large degree.
Not only does it greatly limit litigation over time of death and end
double administration in most cases, it is also much more likely to
result in effectuating the average intestate's intent. Since anyone
who does not survive for even five days will not receive any benefi-
cial enjoyment of the property, it is unlikely that the intestate
would wish the property to descend in the usual manner. Under
the U.P.C. provision, the heirs of the intestate rather than the
heirs of the beneficiary will ultimately receive the property.
The only problem is that the U.P.C. provision may not go far
enough. Suppose husband and wife are in an automobile accident;
he is killed instantly, and she survives for a week. Since she sur-
vived more than five days, she will inherit the property. In view of
the length of time it takes to administer an estate, she will never
have beneficial use of it, and after her death, her heirs, not her
husband's, will receive the property. The drafters of the U.P.C. did
not include a longer survival period, though wills frequently pro-
vide for survival by thirty days or more. The five day period coin-
cides with the time after a death that administration can begin.77
And, since the U.P.C. provides for distribution without administra-
tion in many cases, a longer survival requirement could cause de-
lay. In the large estate, which might require administration even





The U.P.C. vastly changes the common law position on treat-
ment of an inter vivos gift from the intestate to an heir. At com-
77. U.P.C. §§ 3-302, -307.
78. The Federal Estate Tax marital deduction is available for a gift from one spouse to
another even if the surviving spouse survives for only a brief period. In order to protect this
deduction for a large estate in the case where the spouse survives for fewer than 120 hours
(or the couple dies simultaneously), a will must be made. In an estate large enough to incur
estate tax liability, wills are more likely. The drafters of the Code, recognizing that this
provision would result in the loss of the marital deduction in some cases of intestacy, de-




mon law, any gift from an intestate to a lineal descendant might be
an "advancement" if the decedent so intended.s Since the intent
of the decedent is rarely clear at probate, this question was often
litigated. Under the U.P.C., such a gift will not be treated as an
advancement and deducted from that heir's portion of the estate
unless the decedent leaves a contemporaneously written document
stating that it is to be considered an advancement or the recipient
acknowledges, in writing, that it is an advancement. The recipi-
ent's acknowledgment can be made at any time. The U.P.C. makes
it clear that the doctrine of advancement applies only where the
decedent dies intestate as to all his property, and that property
found to be an advancement is valued (for purposes of calculating
the share of the estate to which the recipient of the advancement
is entitled) at the time he gets possession of the property or at the
time of the decedent's death, should that event occur first, as
where the property is a future interest. It also provides that an
advancement to an heir who predeceases the intestate will not be
taken into account in computing the share of that recipient's de-
scendants who are heirs unless the contemporaneous writing or the
recipient's acknowledgment provides otherwise.80
For example, if the decedent who has three children at the
time of the gift gives $10,000 to his daughter and she acknowledges
in writing that it is an advancement of part of her share of the
estate, when the decedent dies, she will be charged with its receipt.
If he leaves an estate of $140,000, she would receive $40,000, and
the decedent's other children would get $50,000 each. However, if
she dies before her father, leaving two children, the estate will be
divided without taking the advancement into account, unless the
acknowledgment provides otherwise. Therefore, each of the intes-
tate's surviving children would receive $46,666, and the children of
the recipient, who take by representation, would each receive
$23,333. Another novel feature of the U.P.C.'s treatment of ad-
vancement is the extension of the doctrine to any "heir," rather
than limiting it to children of the intestate.
The Arkansas provision on advancements is virtually identical
to the U.P.C., and in fact is the November 1967 draft of this sec-
tion of the Code.8 It does not, however, require that a writing by
79. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 129.
80. U.P.C. § 2-110.
81. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-153 (1971), compiler's note.
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the decedent indicating that a gift or an advancement be "contem-
poraneous." Nor does it contain the language that an advancement
to a recipient who predeceases the intestate may be used in calcu-
lating the shares of the recipient's descendants if the writing or
acknowledgment so provides. These two variations in the U.P.C.
were made after the enactment of this section in Arkansas in 1969.
The first change prevents an intestate from giving property as a
"gift," and then later changing his mind. The second merely ex-
tends the flexibility of the advancement as an estate planning tool.
Obviously most persons who will take the trouble to place in writ-
ing instructions about how to treat an inter vivos gift in computing
his intestate estate would make a will; but where the intestate laws
are suitable, a person might choose to use inter vivos gifts, with
such a declaration, in lieu of a will. While the differences between





In the related matter of the treatment of debts owed by an
heir to the decedent, the U.P.C. provides that such a debt will not
be used in computing the share of any person other than the
debtor.2 So if the decedent loans money to his daughter and she
survives, the loan would be deducted from her share of the estate.
But if she predeceases him, it would not be deducted from her de-
scendant's shares.
Arkansas has already enacted a virtually identical section with
very insignificant differences in wording.83 The U.P.C. and the
existing Arkansas provisions are in accord with current law in most
American jurisdictions."
PROTECTION OF SPOUSE AND FAMILY
Introduction
Throughout Anglo-American law, and also in the civil law
based system of inheritance, there is emphasis not only on effec-
82. U.P.C. § 2-111.
83. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-154 (1971).
84. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 141.
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tuating the decedent's intention in regard to disposition of his
wealth, but also on requiring that some portion of it be devoted to
his immediate family, even if he does not wish to do so.
In the common law based system, the major protections have
extended to the surviving spouse (often only the widow), and dece-
dents have been relatively free to disinherit their children. In re-
cent years, there has been a great deal of criticism of even this
limitation.85 The argument is that the protection is not needed
since very few decedents attempt to devise a substantial portion of
their assets away from their families and that such a minor prob-
lem does not justify a limit on freedom of testation. Of course, the
very existence of the legal restriction operates to discourage other
testators from attempting to disinherit, and at the same time en-
courages the draftsman to counsel his client against trying to do so.
Moreover, if only a small number of people would wish to deprive
their families of a share of their estate, then the freedom of testa-
tion of most persons is not, as a practical matter, greatly limited.
Protection of the Spouse
Many United States jurisdictions employ a system of protec-
tion based on common law dower.86 In a number of states, that has
been replaced by enactment of "forced share" legislation or modi-
fied into "statutory dower.""7 Because such systems only protect
the spouse from testamentary attempts to leave property to others
and from inter vivos transfers of land, virtually all jurisdictions
have had to deal with the problems of inter vivos transfers of other
property which effectively defeat the statute. A number of dif-
ferent approaches have been developed, both judicially and
statutorily."
The drafters of the U.P.C. rejected the argument that the pro-
tection of the surviving spouse was unnecessary " and enacted a
complex, modern statute designed to allow free transfer of both
85. See, e.g., Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 681 (1966); Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission
Process: The Surviving Spouse, Year's Support and Intestate Succession, 10 GA. L. REv.
447 (1976).
86. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 30.
87. Id.
88. For a full discussion of existing law in this area, see MAcDONALD, FRAUD ON THE
WIDOW'S SHARE (1960).
89. U.P.C. General Comment to art. 2, pt. 2.
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realty and personalty during the decedent's lifetime while protect-
ing the surviving spouse."0 The U.P.C. borrows from the Federal
Estate Tax Law to cover a number of inter vivos transactions that
are commonly referred to as "will substitutes," as well as providing
a share of the probate estate for the surviving spouse.91
The U.P.C. provides that a surviving spouse may elect one-
third of the "augmented estate."" The augmented estate, as de-
fined by the Code, is the probate estate less expenses of the funeral
and administration, all family allowances, and all enforceable
claims, plus the value of certain inter vivos transfers made by the
decedent.9" These transfers are in essence "will substitutes" and
include any transfer in which the decedent reserved a life interest,
the power to revoke, or a right of survivorship, and also certain "in
contemplation of death" transfers unless the spouse agreed to the
transfers. The augmented estate also includes any property which
the surviving spouse received from the decedent." In calculating
the elective share, the spouse is credited with the value of the
property received from the decedent."' This provision has the net
effect of reducing the elective share of the spouse since any prop-
erty already derived from the decedent is later charged against the
elective share. It is designed to remedy another problem rarely
dealt with by current protective schemes-election against the will
by a spouse who has already received substantial assets in non-
probate transfers.
Procedurally, the U.P.C. requires the surviving spouse who
wishes to elect against the will to file a petition to do so within
nine months of the decedent's death or six months after probate of
the will, whichever is later." The right of election is personal and
may not be exercised by the spouse's personal representative. 7
The court may exercise the election for an incompetent spouse.'8
The right of election may be waived, as may the surviving spouse's
90. For a full discussion of the augmented estate concept, see Kurtz, The Augmented
Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective
Share, 62 IowA L. REv. 981 (1977).
91. U.P.C. § 2-202, Comment.
92. Id. § 2-201(a).
93. Id. § 2-202.
94. Id. § 2-202(2).
95. Id. § 2-202, Comment.
96. Id. § 2-205(a).




homestead, exempt property, and family allowance. Waivers may
be made before or after marriage."
The elective share of the surviving spouse is first taken from
interests which have passed to the spouse or were renounced by
the spouse. 1"0 (A life estate or the right to income from a trust is
valued at one-half of the total value of the property unless con-
trary values are established by proof.)101 Equitable apportionment
is applied to the remainder of the augmented estate.10 2 Any person
who is required to contribute to make up the elective share may
either give up the property transferred or pay its value.
10 3
The U.P.C. also provides for the "omitted" spouse.104 If the
will does not provide for a spouse who married the decedent after
the will's execution, the spouse is entitled to the share he or she
would have received under the intestate laws, unless it appears
from the will that the omission was intentional or unless the testa-
tor provided for the spouse outside the will and intended this
transfer to be in lieu of a provision in the will.106 This provision
was added because the U.P.C. does not provide that a subsequent
marriage revokes a will and because the drafters felt that the aver-
age testator would prefer the spouse married after the execution of
the will to take the larger intestate share rather than the elective
share. "
The U.P.C. approach is at great variance with Arkansas's sys-
tem of statutory dower. The Arkansas scheme differs only slightly
from the common law scheme devised in medieval England.
A widow may elect against her husband's will to receive her
"dower." 1  As discussed above in the section on intestacy, dower
will vary according to these factors: the nature of the property
(land or personal property), the existence of descendants of the
husband, and the source of the property. In the situation where
there are surviving descendants of the husband, the wife will re-
ceive an absolute interest in one-third of his personalty and a life
estate in one-third of his land. Where there are no descendants,
99. Id.§ 2-204.
100. Id. § 2-207(a).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 2-207(b).
103. Id. § 2-207(c).
104. Id. § 2-301.
105. Id.
106. Id., Comment
107. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-501(a) (1971).
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her share increases to one-half of personalty absolutely, one-half of
"new acquisitions" in fee, and one-third of "ancestral property" for
life. 10 8
While dower is designed to give the widow a nonbarrable share
of her husband's property, it provides protection against inter
vivos transfers of land only. Personal property of the husband may
be transferred without the wife's consent, as dower attaches only
to personal property which the husband owns at death.10 9 Dower in
real estate is an "inchoate" right during the husband's life, and the
widow receives dower in all lands which her husband owned during
marriage unless she consented to the transfer." 0 In the case of
Richards v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co."' the Arkansas Supreme
Court indicated that any inter vivos transfer of personal property
challenged by a surviving spouse would be voided if it was made in
"fraud" of the widow's rights.
The election procedure provides for notice by the clerk of
court of the right to elect within one month of the admission of the
will to probate; the spouse must file the election, in the form speci-
fied by the statute, within one month after the expiration of the
time for filing claims.' 12 As in the U.P.C., the right of election is
personal and does not survive the spouse's death. The guardian of
an incompetent surviving spouse may exercise the election, but
must be authorized to do so by the court."'
There are no testamentary limitations on the right of a wife to
deprive her husband of a share of her property. He may elect
against her will only if it was written before their marriage.
14
When the husband does elect, the curtesy rights, like a widow's
dower rights, will vary according to the nature of the property, its
source, and the existence of descendants of the wife.
The contrast between the U.P.C. and Arkansas law in regard
to the elective share of the surviving spouse is enormous. Arkansas
law protects only the widow, where the U.P.C. applies to both a
surviving wife or husband. Arkansas relies on a modification of
common law dower, in which the surviving spouse's rights will vary
108. Id. § 61-201, -202.
109. Id. § 61-202.
110. Smith v. Lamb, 87 Ark. 344, 112 S.W. 884 (1908).
111. 261 Ark. 890, 552 S.W.2d 228 (1977).
112. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-502, -503 (1971).
113. Id. § 60-505.
114. Id. § 60-501.
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depending on whether the property is real or personal, the pres-
ence of descendants of the decedent, and the source of the prop-
erty. The U.P.C. relies instead on a system in which the surviving
spouse receives a one-third share of all property, real or personal,
of the decedent. Moreover, it seeks to guarantee that the share
cannot be defeated by inter vivos transfer by including most com-
mon will substitutes in the "augmented estate" and by computing
the surviving spouse's share from this "augmented" estate.
Few arguments-other than tradition-can be made for Ar-
kansas's current system. Although it is designed to provide a mini-
mum share to the widow, it can be defeated by inter vivos trans-
fers of personalty. Dower may have been an effective method of
protection in an earlier society, but today, when personal property
is the main form of wealth, it is inadequate.11 Moreover, the sys-
tem differentiates in the inheritance of property on grounds like
the source of the property and its nature as real or personal prop-
erty which are not relevant today. It also creates a system which
treats men and women differently. The wisdom of such a scheme
in a society in which women frequently contribute substantially to
family support is questionable. More importantly, such a scheme is
arguably unconstitutional after the United States Supreme Court
decision which held that Alabama laws which provided only for ali-
mony from husbands to wives and not from wives to husbands vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment. 116
The U.P.C. provisions are complex and represent a major
change in the elective share system existing in most American ju-
risdictions. However, the U.P.C. solves the biggest problem, how to
handle nonprobate transfers, which typically arises in the adminis-
tration of such systems. Arkansas's law within this area is clearly
in need of revision, and the Code scheme is a comprehensive and




115. Wright, supra note 40.
116. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). In fact, such a challenge was made in the case, In
re Estate of Jack Hawkins, Deceased, No. 65085 in the Probate Court of Pulaski County.
The challenge, made by the beneficiary of the decedent's will who challenged the surviving




While the common-law jurisdictions of the United States all
theoretically permit disinheritance of children,' 17 the enactment of
"pretermitted" heir statutes in fact provide some protection for
children of a decedent. Such statutes theoretically protect only
against "unintentional" disinheritance, but applications often lead
to protection in cases where disinheritance was in fact intended.
Both the U.P.C. and Arkansas include such statutes, but they
differ substantially. The U.P.C. protects only children born or
adopted after the execution of the will, which allows the disinheri-
tance of children existing at the time of execution simply by omis-
sion. Even after-born children will not be "pretermitted" under
the U.P.C. if the will evidences an intention to omit them. More-
over, it does not operate when the other parent of the omitted
child was left "substantially all" of the estate while other children
of the marriage were living. This would mean that if a husband
wrote a will leaving all his property to his wife while the couple
had two children, a third child could not claim as a pretermitted
heir. Finally, the statute does not protect the omitted child when
he has received nonprobate assets "intended . . . to be in lieu of
testamentary transfers."
. Arkansas has a more traditional statute. It applies not only to
children born or adopted after the execution of the will but also to
any child or the issue of any deceased child living at the time of
execution who is not mentioned either by name or as a member of
a class. The law is absolute, despite the fact that it is rather un-
likely that a testator who omits a child in fact does not intend to
do so." Under Arkansas law, as under the U.P.C., the "pretermit-
ted" child or grandchild will receive his or her intestate share.'"
The U.P.C. provision is preferable, if one accepts the proposi-
tion that these statutes are intended to be intent-supplementing
rather than protective devices. In particular, the provision that an
after-born child may not claim his intestate share if his parent's
117. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 36. Louisiana law restricts the right of a parent to
disinherit his children. A certain percentage of the estate, depending on the number of chil-
dren who survive the decedent, must be left to them unless one of ten specific grounds for
disinheritance can be proved. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 1493-1494, 1617-1622 (West 1952 &
Cum. Supp. 1979).
118. Armstrong v. Butler, 262 Ark. 31, 39, 553 S.W.2d 453, 458 (1977) in which the
court states, "Our statute (§ 60-507) is of the 'Missouri type' which operates in favor of the
pretermitted child without regard to the real intention of the testator in regard to the
omission."
119. U.P.C. § 2-302; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-507 (1971).
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will, written before his birth but after the birth of a child of the
marriage, left "substantially all" of the estate to the surviving par-
ent is important. This is a typical estate plan in a small or medium
sized estate, especially where there are minor children, and the law
should not be written to upset it. Even though any lawyer drafting
a will should not fall into this trap, it is preferable not to set it for
the layman. It is possible that the provision that an after-born
child may not claim his intestate share if the will evidences an in-
tention to omit him may give rise to litigation in some cases. Nev-
ertheless, it seems preferable to seek to ascertain the testator's in-
tent than simply to ignore it.
The U.P.C. also provides for the presumably rare case in
which a parent omits a child from his will because he believes the
child is dead.12 0 In that case, the child takes an intestate share.
Under current Arkansas law, of course, such a child would be
"pretermitted," and entitled to his or her elective share.
Allowances and Exempt Property
1. Homestead
U.P.C. § 2-401
Ark. § 62-602; ARK. CONST. art. 9, §§ 4-6, 10
The U.P.C. provides that the surviving spouse (and, if there is
no spouse, the minor and dependent children of the decedent) will
receive a homestead allowance of $5000. This share is in addition
to any intestate share or elective share, and also to any testamen-
tary share, unless the will provides otherwise. Additionally, it is
exempt from all claims against the estate.'
Arkansas grants homestead rights under the state constitu-
tion. 2' Homestead rights may be claimed by a widow and/or minor
children only. The constitution limits the homestead to 160 acres,
provided the value does not exceed $2500, or to eighty acres with-
out regard to value, if the homestead is located "outside any city,
120. U.P.C. § 2-302(d).
121. Id. § 2-401.
122. A proposed new constitution, which contained some minor changes in the home-
stead provision and which extended the homestead provision to surviving spouses of either
sex, was defeated November 4, 1980. The same constitutional questions which are raised by
the dower statutes exist with regard to homestead, also. The constitutionality of the current




town, or village;" and to one acre, provided the value does not ex-
ceed $2500, or to one-fourth acre without regard to value, if the
homestead is in a "city, town, or village." The widow and/or minor
children are entitled to occupy the land and to receive any rents
and profits on it during the life of the widow or the minority of the
children. 123
While the Arkansas provision may result in the awarding of a
very valuable right to the widow, it is not well adapted to modern
circumstances. It exists only if there is real property upon which
the family resides in the husband's estate, and if it has not been
waived. It is therefore inapplicable where the family occupied
rental property, or where they occupied mortgaged property if (as
is usually the case) homestead was waived. Additionally, the widow
cannot sell her homestead rights if she desires to live elsewhere. 124
Therefore, many families will not benefit from the allowance. The
U.P.C. provision, on the other hand, is applicable to every one,




In addition to the homestead allowance, the U.P.C. grants the
surviving spouse $3500 (in excess of any security interests) in fur-
niture, automobiles, "furnishings," appliances and personal effects.
If there is no surviving spouse, the decedent's children receive the
same value. Where there is not $3500 of such property, the benefi-
ciaries will receive other property up to the $3500 value. Like the
homestead allowance, this exempt property allowance is in addi-
tion to any intestate or elective share and also in addition to any
testamentary gift unless the will provides otherwise. This allow-
ance takes priority over all claims except homestead and family
allowance.125
Arkansas grants the widow the right to $2000 of personal
property of the decedent, to be selected by her from the estate.
(The value is reduced to $1000 if the estate is insolvent.) If there is
no widow, the minor children of the decedent receive this property.
And, if the decedent is survived by a widow and by one or more
123. ARK. CONsTr. art. 9, §§ 4-6, 10.
124. Gibson v. Gibson, 264 Ark. 420, 572 S.W.2d 148 (1976).
125. U.P.C. § 2-402.
[Vol. 3:361
ARKANSAS AND UPC
children who are not children of the widow, this allowance goes
one-half to the widow and one-half, in equal shares, to the dece-
dent's minor children."
In addition to this property, a widow is entitled to "such fur-
niture, furnishings, appliances, implements, and equipment" as is
necessary to the use and occupancy of the dwelling, provided the
widow was living with her husband at the time of his death. This
provision takes priority over claims by heirs and creditors."'
The major difference in the two provisions is the larger
amount of exempt property which the U.P.C. grants. However, be-
cause of the provisions allowing the widow "such furniture, fur-
nishings, appliances, implements, and equipment," the Arkansas
statute may sometimes result in a larger allowance. The U.P.C.
provides for a uniform allowance for all families and allows selec-
tion of the full amount of the exempt property. Additionally, the
granting of this property to the decedent's children in the absence
of a surviving spouse may be significant, but only when the estate
is insolvent, since in the absence of a surviving spouse, the children
would be the only heirs and are likely to be the major legatees if
there is a will.
3. Family Allowances
U.P.C. §§ 2-403; 2-404
Ark. §§ 52-2501(c); 62-2501.1 to -.3; 62-2502
The U.P.C. provides for payment of allowances for living ex-
penses to a surviving spouse and to minor and dependent children
of the decedent during the period of administration. These pay-
ments take priority over all claims against the estate except the
homestead allowance, but allowances cannot be paid beyond one
year if the estate is insufficient to pay all claims. There is no mone-
tary limit on these payments; they are to be allowed by the per-
sonal representative in a "reasonable" amount.128 The comments
indicate that the amount of the allowance should be determined by
reference to the family's standard of living and the availability of
other resources for their support.129 The amounts paid under this
126. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2501(a) (1971).
127. Id. § 62-2501(b).
128. U.P.C. § 2-403; however, the personal representative may allow no more than
$6000 (or $500 per month for 12 months) without court approval. Id. § 2-404.
129. Id. § 2-403, Comment.
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section are not charged against any intestate or elective share, nor
are they charged against a testamentary share unless the will pro-
vides otherwise.130
While current Arkansas law provides for the payment of al-
lowances for the family of the decedent, the payments are limited
to $500 and are payable only in the first two months after the
death of the decedent. Moreover, as in other allowance provisions,
this payment is available only to a widow and minor children. 131
Clearly these amounts and the time limitation will very often be
insufficient. Additionally, a widower or a dependent child above
the age of majority is not eligible for allowance.
Arkansas provides several other types of allowance to a dece-
dent's family: the widow "may tarry in the mansion or chief dwell-
ing house of her husband" for two months without paying rent,
and during this time "she shall have a reasonable sustenance" from
the husband's estate.1 32 If the widow's dower is not assigned during
this two month quarantine period, she is entitled to continue to
remain in the "mansion or chief dwelling house. . . together with
the farm thereto attached" until her dower is assigned.133 More-
over, until the assignment of dower, she is entitled to be awarded
that part of the rent of the real estate, in proportion to her interest
in it. 34 These three sections survive from an earlier statute and are
not part of the Probate Code. "' While these sections were not re-
pealed, and one could therefore argue that they are cumulative
with all other provisions for allowances, they are apparently rarely
used. Only one case construing this statute has been decided since
1926, Price v. Price,13 1 in which the Arkansas Supreme Court de-
termined that the quarantine rights of the widow do not extend to
lands attached to the mansion which are used for other than farm
purposes.
Current Arkansas law also provides for payments from the es-
tate to minor distributees during the course of administration.
These payments, however, may be made only where the estate is
solvent, and any such payment is to be deducted from the share of
130. Id. § 2-403.
131. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2501(c) (1971).
132. Id. § 62-2501.1.
133. Id. § 62-2501.2.
134. Id. § 62-2501.3.
135. Id. § 62-2501.1 to -.3, Compiler's notes.




The U.P.C. provisions for allowances are certainly more realis-
tic than Arkansas's in light of current economic realities. Enact-
ment of the U.P.C. would make the allowance meaningful to a sur-
viving spouse or children. At the same time, the repeal of the
obsolete Arkansas statutes providing for quarantine would prevent
any litigation concerning their continued validity.
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION
Both Arkansas and the U.P.C. provide for attested wills and
holographic wills; neither permits an oral or nuncupative will. Both
have identical sections setting the minimum age for making a will




All wills statutes require certain formalities for execution of
attested wills.'" The requirement serves several purposes: (1) the
formalities, particularly witnessing, are supposed to prevent
"fraud" and to minimize influence by beneficiaries; (2) the formal
process should impress the testator with the serious legal conse-
quences of the act; and (3) compliance with the statute provides
certainty as to validity of the transaction. The basic problem, how-
ever, lies with the nature of will transactions. Unlike the legislative
process, where regularized procedures in the enactment of statutes
or promulgation of regulations are familiar to the people involved
and where law-trained personnel are involved in the whole process,
wills can be prepared and executed without legal advice. So long as
the statute does not require preparation by a lawyer, some attested
wills are bound to be prepared by lay persons. "Will kits" can be
purchased; books advocate do-it-yourself wills.1 "9 The issue then
137. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2502 (1971).
138. See 2 W. Bows & D. PARKM PAGR ON Tim LAw oF WELus § 19.4 (3d ed. rev.
1960) [hereinafter cited as PAGE]. Several recent articles are Chafin, Execution, Revocation,
and Revalidation of Wills: A Critique of Existing Statutory Formalities, 11 GA. L. Rav. 297
(1977) (comparing Georgia statutes with the U.P.C.); Nelson & Starck, Formalities and For-
malism: A Critical Look at the Execution of Wills, 6 PzP'RDmNE L. Rzv. 331 (1979).
139. The most famous is N. Dacey, How to Avoid Probate (2d ed. 1979). Compare
Ashley, You AND YOUR WnL (1975) and Teach Your Wife How to Be a Widow (Joseph
Newman ed. 1973). Both of the latter advocate use of a carefully selected lawyer.
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becomes how complex the formalities imposed by law should be.
The formalities may be made so complex and difficult that testa-
tors will be discouraged from drawing their own wills. While there
is much to be said for such a policy, it is likely to be more popular
with lawyers than with the public.1 40 The contrary legislative pol-
icy is already expressed in the provision for holographs. Hence for-
malities ought to be designed to provide safeguards, but not to
strike down documents obviously intended to have legal effect. The
present Arkansas statute on execution of attested wills imposes
maximum formalities:
(1) the testator must declare to the attesting witnesses that the
instrument is his will ("publication");
(2) he must sign in the presence of two witnesses or acknowl-
edge his prior signature to them (a proxy signature is permitted
under rigid restrictions);
(3) the signature must be at the end of the will;
14 1
(4) the testator must request the witnesses to sign;
(5) the witnesses must sign in the presence of the testator (al-
though not necessarily in the presence of each other).1 4s
By way of contrast the U.P.C. provides a minimum of formalities:
(1) the testator must sign the will; if it is signed for him, the
signature must be made in his presence and at his express
direction;
140, See Wellman, Arkansas and the Uniform Probate Code: Some Issues and
Answers, 2 UALR L. J. 1, 15 (1979):
What lawyers usually fail to perceive, possibly because of conflicting interests in
the fees that come from assisting persons with wills, is that the public plainly
insists on being permitted to use a "do-it-yourself" approach to will making, as is
permitted in virtually every other enterprise. Further, the legal profession should
note its relatively low status in polls showing consumer confidence and respect for
various professions and callings. If there is concern for upgrading the image of the
profession, it may be beneficial to take a close look at rules that appear to force
the public to rely on lawyers. If holographic wills prove to be a source of trouble
and litigation, it will become obvious to the consuming public that lawyers have
valuable training and experience to offer prospective testators.
141. The Arkansas Supreme Court has on occasion been liberal in finding that the
signature is at the "end." See Weems v. Smith, 218 Ark. 554, 237 S.W.2d 880 (1951) (where
the concluding words of the last sentence of the will followed testator's signature).
142. Although the Arkansas statute expressly requires that the witnesses sign "at the
request of the testator," the Arkansas Supreme Court has adopted a praiseworthy policy of
liberal construction and has held that there need not be a specific request when the wit-
nesses sign in the presence of the testator. Hanel v. Springle, 237 Ark. 356, 372 S.W.2d 822




(2) the testator does not have to sign in the presence of the wit-
nesses; if he has previously signed, he must acknowledge to the
witnesses that the signature is his or that the document is his
will;
(3) he does not have to "publish" the will, i.e., declare the docu-
ment to be his will;
(4) the witnesses must sign but are not required to sign in the
testator's presence, nor in the presence of each other;
(5) the statutory language does not explicitly require that the
testator request the witnesses to sign.
While these appear to be "bare bones" formalities, they provide
considerable protection against fraud or forgery, probably as ade-
quately as the more elaborate formalities of the present Arkansas
statutes. This is always a matter of degree: one more witness is
always better than the statutory requirement of two, for example.
True, a person may acknowledge to two persons that the signature
on a paper is his signature, and may have signed the paper in the
mistaken belief that it was a legal paper other than a will. On the
other hand, consider the number of cases where the testator be-
lieves he has done everything necessary to have a valid will, yet has
fallen short because he has not observed one of the formal require-
ments. In one unreported case the lawyer took a will to the hospi-
tal to have the will executed by his client; the lawyer was supposed
to have signed as one of the witnesses, but somehow overlooked
signing at the time; he later signed the will when he was back at
his office out of the presence of the testator. The will was denied
probate. Yet who could doubt what the testator wanted and be-
lieved he had accomplished? If the courts in probate were willing
to adopt a doctrine of "substantial compliance," as they do for the
Statute of Frauds, the more stringent statute would be less objec-
tionable. 148 However, the solution ought not be left to uncertain
treatment by the courts, but rather ought to be reached at the leg-
islative stage by setting minimum standards which afford protec-
tion without thwarting intent.
Experience under the U.P.C. indicates that relaxation of the
formalities has not led to widespread change in execution of at-
143. The U.P.C. attempts to simplify formalities. Another approach has been advo-
cated by Professor John H. Langbein: sustaining wills which technically do not comply but
which meet a "substantial compliance" test. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the
Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1975); Langbein, Crumbling of the Wills Act: Australians
Point the Way, 65 A.B.A.J. 1192 (1979).
1980]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
tested wills. Lawyers continue to execute wills with maximum for-
mality; they know the client may change his domicile before he
dies or may acquire real property in a non-U.P.C. state, so that the
law of other states may govern the validity of the will. In fact, be-
cause the U.P.C. permits an additional optional formality which
prevents later contest on grounds of execution, the lawyer-guided
will often is more formal. This is the "self-proved" will, one as to
which the testator and the witnesses have formally acknowledged
the execution before a notary or other official authorized to give an
oath.1 44 Not only is no other proof of execution required at time of
probate, the self-proving affidavit cannot be contradicted as to
facts of execution in event of contest (except, of course, in the rare
case of a forgery and impersonation before the notary).145 A self-
proved will can still be contested on grounds of lack of capacity,




Arkansas already permits holographic wills. The major sub-
stantive difference is that Arkansas now requires "the entire body
of the will" to be in the testator's handwriting, whereas the U.P.C.
requires "the material provisions" to be handwritten. If the testa-
tor used a printed form will with the opening ("exordium") clause
and a revocation clause printed, the Arkansas statute would seem
to invalidate the will even though the material provisions and the
signature were all in the testator's handwriting. It is, of course,
possible that the Arkansas courts could ignore the printed matter
and hold only the rest to be the "body" of the will.
146
The Arkansas statute contains a proof requirement which is
not in the U.P.C., namely that the handwriting and signature be
established by the testimony of three witnesses. Section 3-303 of
the U.P.C. would permit the will to be probated informally on the
basis of a sworn statement or affidavit of one witness; in a formal
144. U.P.C. § 2-504. Cf. AR& STAT. ANN. § 60-417 (1971) (allowing use of an affidavit
by the attesting witness in lieu of direct testimony, but only in an uncontested probate).
145. U.P.C. § 3-406(b).
146. Courts in several jurisdictions treat the printed material as "surplusage." See




testacy proceeding the amount of proof depends on whether the
probate is contested. If all the heirs agree that the holograph is
valid, it seems superfluous to require more than one witness. Thus,
if there is no contest, under Section 3-405 of the U.P.C. the court
may allow probate on the basis of the sworn petition alone. If there
is doubt about the handwriting, a contest is likely and expert testi-
mony will probably be obtained anyway.
Neither statute requires that the holograph be dated, or that





There are'substantial differences between the U.P.C. and the
present Arkansas statute. For one, Arkansas places a minimum age
of eighteen on the competence of the witness to an attested will.
The U.P.C. allows use of younger persons if they are competent
generally to testify in court. The major difference lies in the use of
a devisee under the will as a witness. Under both statutes the will
is not invalidated. However, under the Arkansas statute the wit-
ness will forfeit the part of his devise which exceeds his intestate
share, unless he is a supernumerary witness.4 8 Under the U.P.C.
there is no forfeiture, although the use of the interested witness
may be a factor if the will is challenged on grounds of lack of ca-
pacity or undue influence. The unfairness of the Arkansas statute
is illustrated by the following hypothetical: Testator has a prior
valid will disinheriting one son and leaving all his estate to his
daughter; later he executes a second will, witnessed by the daugh-
ter and one other person, which devises a one-fourth interest to the
son and three-fourths to the daughter; the daughter will forfeit
one-fourth which would then pass intestate.
147. Where the testator's name appears in the body of a holograph but not at the end,
there is an issue as to whether the testator intended this as his signature. Compare Nelson
v. Texarkana Hist. Soc'y & Museum, 257 Ark. 394, 516 S.W.2d 882 (1974) (not a signature)
with Smith v. MacDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 741 (1972) (will allowed). The Arkansas
court is liberal in admitting evidence of testator's declarations and the surrounding circum-
stances on this issue.
148. Note that the spouse of a devisee may be an attesting witness under the Arkansas
statute. Rockafellow v. Rockafellow, 192 Ark. 563, 93 S.W.2d 321 (1936).
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Choice of Law as to Execution
U.P.C. § 2-506
Ark. § 60-405
Both statutes provide for a choice of law, but the U.P.C. is
broader. The U.P.C. applies to a will executed within the state by
a testator in accordance with the law of his domicile. Suppose, for
example, a non-resident of Arkansas is visiting in Arkansas and
acquires realty here; he decides he needs a will and prepares one
himself in compliance with the law of his home state with which he
is familiar; the will would be valid under the U.P.C. but apparently
invalid under the Arkansas statute. No reason can be given for
such a rule; Arkansas would recognize the will as valid if executed
in any other state. Hopefully, if the testator had gone to an Arkan-
sas lawyer and explained that the domicile was in another state,
the lawyer would comply with both Arkansas law and the law of
the state of domicile.
The U.P.C. offers some additional choices for rare situations.
The foreign national might execute a will in accordance with the
law of the nation of which he is a citizen (e.g., Mexico). If he exe-
cutes it while residing in the United States and the execution does
not comply with local law, Arkansas would not recognize the will as
valid, whereas the U.P.C. would. Likewise a person domiciled in
one state who plans to move to another state might follow the law
of the second state. If his residence is in the second state at death,
the will would be valid under the U.P.C. whether or not it com-
plied with the law of the place of execution or of domicile at the
time of execution.
Revocation by Subsequent Will or Act
U.P.C. § 2-507
Ark. § 60-406
Of all the U.P.C. provisions considered in this article, the
section on revocation is the least innovative. In fact it makes no
change at all in the basic wording utilized in most American
states.
149
The section permits revocation by a subsequent will which ex-
pressly revokes or is inconsistent with the prior will. "Will" is de-
fined in U.P.C. Section 1-201(48) to include a testamentary instru-
149. See generally ATKMsoN, supra note 29, § 87; 2 PAGE, supra note 138, § 21.4.
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ment which merely revokes a prior will. Hence there is no need for
the additional provision found in some statutes providing for revo-
cation by a writing clearly indicating an intention to revoke. Al-
though U.P.C. Section 2-507 says nothing about the formalities of
execution of the subsequent will, U.P.C. Section 2-502 applies to
"every will" for purposes of validity and obviously governs the re-
voking document.
Can a holograph revoke an attested will? Clearly the answer is
affirmative.15 Nothing in the U.P.C. would indicate a different an-
swer. A holograph is just as valid as an attested will; it is not a
"second class" testamentary document, although it may often be
viewed that way by practicing lawyers. Lawyers who have prepared
an attested will and guided its execution by the client would like to
believe the will should only be changed by a subsequent attested
will (hopefully prepared by the same lawyer who drafted the first
will). Nothing has ever prevented a client from tearing up the orig-
inal attested will, thereby revoking it. The testator is clearly, then,
free to execute a holographic will to replace the attested will. Why
should he not be able to revoke by the express language of a ho-
lograph alone? (It provides more reliable proof of intent to revoke
than the absence of an original attested will, which without more
raises a presumption that the testator who had possession of the
will destroyed it and did so with intent to revoke.)
The present Arkansas section, adopted in 1979, is identical to
the U.P.C. except for the addition of the last sentence, which
seems to be superfluous. (If only part of the will had been revoked,
the remainder obviously is unrevoked and still valid.) The 1979
change was brought about by an unusual opinion of the Arkansas
Supreme Court in which there was dicta that a subsequent will
automatically revoked a prior will even though the subsequent will
contained no revocation clause. 16'
Two judicial doctrines are left untouched by both the U.P.C.
and the Arkansas statute: the presumption that the will has been
revoked if it was in the testator's possession and is apparently
missing at the time of his death,"5' and the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation.1 53 The court is free to mold those doctrines to
150. Smith v. Nelson, 227 Ark. 512, 299 S.W.2d 645 (1957).
151. Parker v. Mobley, 264 Ark. 805, 806, 577 S.W.2d 583, 584 (1979).
152. Garrett v. Butler, 229 Ark. 653, 317 S.W.2d 283 (1958); Porter v. Sheffield, 212
Ark. 1015, 208 S.W.2d 999 (1948).
153. The writer of Note, Wills-Dependent Relative Revocation, 8 ARK. L. REv. 193
1980]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
achieve a just result on the individual facts. A will which was in
the testator's possession and is not found after his death is pre-
sumed to have been destroyed by the testator with the intent of
revoking it. However, the missing will may have been destroyed by
another person before or after the testator's death, it may have
been destroyed by accident, or it may simply be lost; in these cases
it is not revoked. The presumption of revocation can be rebutted
by testimony that the will was seen after testator's death, or by
evidence that others had access to the will and no reason can be
shown why testator would have wanted the will revoked, or by
statements of testator shortly before his death indicating that the
will was still in effect. In these cases it is necessary to prove the
contents of the will. Arkansas presently has a statute to govern
proof of the lost or destroyed will, assuming the will is not re-
voked.'" Unfortunately, the statute's wording has substantive con-
tent. It provides that no will shall be allowed unless it is proved to
have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or is
shown to have been fraudulently destroyed in the lifetime, of the
testator. If the will was accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of
the testator or destroyed by someone at the testator's request but
not in his presence, the statute literally bars proof of the will, al-
though it is not revoked and therefore should be a valid will enti-
tled to probate. The U.P.C. contains no comparable provision and
has no section governing proof of a lost or destroyed will which has
not been properly revoked, 15' although the U.P.C. does require
(1954) erroneously suggested that ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-408 "may" prohibit use of depen-
dent relative revocation. That section deals with revival. Dependent relative revocation is a
completely different doctrine. Walpole v. Lewis, 254 Ark. 89, 492 S.W.2d 410 (1973) may
espouse a subtle and limited form of the doctrine. Where the testator has crossed out part
of a clause and attempted thereby a different disposition, which is invalid, the original will
is probated without partial revocation.
154. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-304 (1971) provides:
No will of any testator shall be allowed to be proved as a lost or destroyed
will, unless the same shall be proved to have been in existence at the time of the
death of the testator, or be shown to have been fraudulently destroyed in the
lifetime of the testator; nor unless its provisions be clearly and distinctly proved
by at least two [2] witnesses, a correct copy or draft being deemed equivalent to
one [1] witness.
155. Absence of such a provision may raise unnecessary questions. See In re Estate of
Hartman, 172 Mont. 225, 563 P.2d 569 (1977) (U.P.C. adopted in Montana, prior section on
lost wills repealed). The Arizona Probate Code, based on the U.P.C., added a section to
govern proof of the lost or fraudulently destroyed will; ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-3415
reads:
If the original will, or an authenticated copy of the will as probated in another
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probate of such a will be a formal proceeding. Normally, the best
proof of the contents of a lost or destroyed will would be a copy of
the will with testimony of either the draftsman or one of the wit-
nesses that the copy is a true and accurate copy of the original will
as executed by the testator. Even without a specific proof section
such as the one in Arkansas, no court will probate a will if the
contents cannot be established by clear evidence.
Revocation by Change in Circumstances
U.P.C. § 2-508
Ark. § 60-407
The basic rule underlying the above sections is the same. Di-
vorce revokes provisions of a will in favor of the divorced spouse.
In both the U.P.C. section and the Arkansas section, marriage af-
ter execution of the will and birth of issue after execution of the
will are not treated as revocation. Under the U.P.C. the later
spouse and issue are given a statutory share as pretermitted heirs
and under the Arkansas statute the later spouse is protected by an
elective share and the later born child is entitled to a statutory
share.157 Divorce is, therefore, the only subsequent event which
revokes provisions of a prior will.
The U.P.C., however, contains a more carefully drawn provi-
sion. Under the Arkansas statute the following situations are left
for litigation:
(1) is nomination of the spouse for appointment as executor a
"provision" in favor of the spouse or is it unaffected by the
divorce?
(2) is the creation or exercise of a power of appointment in favor
of the spouse a "provision" which is revoked if there is a divorce?
(3) what if the marriage is annulled, instead of the parties
obtaining a divorce?
(4) if the will contains an alternative gift if the spouse "pre-
deceases me," does that gift operate when there is a divorce?
jurisdiction, is not available, the contents of the will can be proved by a copy of
the will and testimony of at least one credible witness that the copy is a true copy
of the original. If a copy of the will is unavailable, contents of the will can be
proved only by clear and convincing proof. A witness need not be an attesting
witness to the will. If the missing will is allowed for probate, the order of the court
shall set forth the contents of the will as found by the court.
156. Lamb v. Ford, 239 Ark. 339, 389 S.W.2d 419 (1965).
157. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-507 (1971).
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(5) if the testator remarries the divorced spouse and is still mar-
ried at the time of death, are the provisions for the spouse effec-
tive despite the intervening divorce?
(6) if the will was drawn in anticipation of the divorce and made
express provision for the spouse "even if we are no longer mar-
ried," is the divorce nevertheless a revocation?
The uncertainty of the answers to these questions, which are cer-
tain to arise and cause expensive litigation, is adequate reason to




When a testator has executed two wills, the latter expressly or
by inconsistency revoking the former, and still later the testator
destroys the second will and retains the first will intact, should the
first will be probated? This is a problem of "revival" and various
rules have been formulated to deal with it."8 The English com-
mon-law courts took the position that the second will took effect
only at the death of the testator and did not revoke the prior will
until then; hence upon destruction of the second will, the first will
remained unrevoked. Although the ecclesiastical courts held that
the first will was revoked when the testator executed his later will,
these courts permitted evidence to establish that the testator in-
tended to "revive" the first will. A number of American states, in-
cluding Arkansas, follow the early New York statute which re-
quired "reexecution" (without defining what that means). In any
state a still later third will or codicil may "republish" the first will
by reference to it and in effect revive it.
The U.P.C. adopts the ecclesiastical rule, permitting revival if
that is shown to be the testator's intent. For this purpose testi-
mony is admissible to prove oral statements of the testator,
whether made at the time of the destruction of the revoking will or
at some later time, as to his intent. The U.P.C., if adopted, would
therefore change the Arkansas law. The U.P.C. is preferable be-
cause it gives effect to the testator's intent. Although the U.P.C.
contains no express provision for republication by codicil, that doc-
trine would remain applicable in a proper case.
158. See generally ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 92; 2 PAGE, supra note 138, §§ 21.49 to
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Parameters to the Statute of Wills
A number of provisions in the U.P.C. allow reference in the
will to extrinsic documents and events, without requiring them to
be set forth in full in the will itself. Some of these sections merely
express doctrine which some courts have worked out judicially.
The U.P.C. statutory sections are:
2-510-authorizing incorporation by reference,
2-511--embodying the Uniform Testamentary Additions to
Trusts Act, permitting pour-over into living trusts or testamen-
tary trusts under the will of another person,
2-512-permitting reference to acts or events which have signifi-
cance apart from the will,
2-513-allowing the will to refer to a separate list disposing of
tangible personal property.
In effect each of these recognizes that some of the details of
property disposition can be outside the concept that the testator
must express in a valid will, attested or holographic, the directions
for succession to his property.
1. Incorporation by Reference
U.P.C. § 2-510
[No corresponding Arkansas statute.]
Courts are divided as to whether to permit incorporation by
reference in the absence of statute.'8 9 Those courts which do recog-
nize the doctrine often impose fairly strict limitations: (1) the doc-
ument must be in existence when the will is executed, (2) it must
be described as being in existence, (3) the writing must be de-
scribed with reasonable accuracy, (4) the intent to incorporate it
must appear in the will, and (5) the writing must fit the descrip-
tion in the will. The U.P.C. seems to adopt only (1), (3) and (4).
For example, consider the following illustration. A testator pro-
vides in his will: "A list of stocks will be found attached to this
will. I give said stocks to my daughter Elizabeth." After the testa-
tor's death, a list is found with the will, the list bears a date the
same as the will and witnesses testify that the testator had at-
tached it to the will when the will was executed. The gift would fail
under traditional doctrine, but would be valid under the U.P.C.
159. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 80; 2 PAGE, supra note 138, §§ 19.17 to -.32. See Note,
Wills-Incorporation of Extrinsic Documents by Reference, 6 ARK. L. REv. 496 (1952).
1980]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
The adoption of the U.P.C. section would really make no
change in Arkansas law; the Arkansas Supreme Court has adopted
a judicial rule which approximates the U.P.C. statutory version.'"
2. Testamentary Additions to Trusts
U.P.C. § 2.511
Ark. § 60-601
Arkansas enacted the Uniform Testamentary Additions to
Trusts Act in 1963. The purpose of the Act is to permit the testa-
tor by his will to add assets to an existing trust, without setting
forth the entire terms of the trust in the will itself and without
causing the assets already in the trust to be administered as part of
the probate estate. The "pour-over" may be to:
a revocable trust set up during lifetime by the testator or by some
other person (such as a spouse or parent);
a life insurance trust, funded or unfunded;
an irrevocable trust in existence at the testator's death;
a trust created under the will of another person who has prede-
ceased the testator.
It is not necessary that the trust be established when the will is
executed.
Need there be any assets in the trust? In the case of a revoca-
ble life insurance trust, the settlor may retain all incidents of own-
ership and the only "property" in the trust is the right to receive
the proceeds under a designation of the trustee as beneficiary. Al-
though creating a highly tenuous property interest at best, this
procedure is expressly permitted. Suppose a trust agreement is ex-
ecuted but no assets are transferred into the trust; instead the
trustee or a third person has a power of attorney to transfer assets
into the trust. Clearly, there is no trust in existence in such a case
until assets are transferred, but the statutory authorization for the
devise to the named trustee should overcome the conceptual diffi-
culty. As a precaution, most estate planners would probably trans-
fer a nominal asset into the trust when the trust agreement is
executed.
160. Montgomery v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 357, 230 S.W.2d 51 (1950), noted in 6 Aim
L. Rxv. 496 (1952). The court allowed incorporation of a revocable living trust document
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3. Events of Independent Significance
U.P.C. § 2-512
[No corresponding Arkansas statute.]
Wills often dispose of property by reference to extrinsic facts.
For example, it is not unusual to devise "my residence at the time
of my death, and all the furniture and furnishings therein." Here
the testator may change his residence between execution of the will
and the time of his death; he may replace or add furniture from
time to time. Or there may be a devise "to my son - or, if he
predeceases me and leave no issue, to his widow." In this case the
reference is to an extraneous event, the marriage of the son. The
examples can be legion: "the contents of my safety deposit box,"
"my stamp collection," "all of my hunting and fishing equipment,"
"all stocks and bonds owned by me at my death," a devise to "the
person who takes best care of me in my declining years," a devise
"after the death of my said wife to those of our grandchildren who
survive her," etc. These devises are upheld without statutory au-
thorization,"' but the statute serves as a reminder of their validity
and rounds out the concept of what must be included in the will
itself.
4. Separate List Disposing of Tangible Personal Property
U.P.C. § 2-513
Ark. § 2-513
The Arkansas statute, taken from the U.P.C., was enacted in
1979. The U.P.C. provision is an innovation which was drafted in
response to requests of practicing lawyers for a special exception to
the Statute of Wills. Clients often want to dispose of personal be-
longings to friends and relatives and either have not thought out
the details when their wills are prepared or want to be able to
change the items or the devisees from time to time without going
through the formalities of executing a codicil each time. The items
may or may not have a great monetary value. The Code permits
this practice with some safeguards: (1) the will itself must refer to
the list and adequately describe it (such as "a separate list which
will be found with this will"); (2) items specifically devised in the
will itself cannot be changed by the list; (3) only tangible personal
property not used in a trade or business can be disposed of by the
161. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 81; 2 PAGE, supra note 138, § 19.34.
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list (not money, promissory notes, stocks, or bonds, all of which are
choses in action); (4) the list must either be in testator's handwrit-
ing or it must be signed by him. With those qualifications, the pro-
vision is broad: the list can be prepared after the will is drafted; it
can be altered by the testator at any time. Note that a separate
writing in the testator's handwriting and signed by him would be
valid as a holograph and hence is not subject to the limitations
imposed by U.P.C. section 2-513.
WILL CONSTRUCTION
The U.P.C. and the Arkansas statutes both contain a number
of sections dealing with common problems of will construction: the
effect of subsequent changes in specifically devised property
(ademption), the effect of death of a devisee before the testator or
other failure of a devise (lapse), the question of whether a specific
devise passes subject to a lien or free of the lien (exoneration out
of general assets), and the inclusion of after-acquired property. In
general, the U.P.C. provides a more precise set of rules on these
matters; 163 it also provides rules on a variety of construction
problems not presently covered by the Arkansas statutes. Although
the order in which assets should be used to satisfy debts is com-
monly treated as a problem of distribution (abatement), it is prop-
erly one of construction and will be so considered for purposes of
this article.
Although many of the statutory rules pertain to a "specific de-
vise" (and "devise" is defined to mean a testamentary disposition
of real or personal property, just as it is in section 62-2003 of the
Arkansas Code), the U.P.C. does not define what a "specific de-
vise" is. In most situations the intent to give specific property is
clear from the terms of the will:
"I give my ten shares of AT&T stock ......
"I give all of my AT&T stock ......
"I give stock in AT&T evidenced by certificate No. xxxx ......
Suppose, however, that testator's will simply reads:
"I give ten shares of AT&T stock .... "
162. Most of the U.P.C. sections on construction are accompanied by helpful Official
Comments. For a general discussion of the U.P.C. rules of construction, see L. AVERuLL,
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE IN A NuTsHELL §§ 10.01 to -.07 (1978); 1 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
PRACTIcE MANuAL, 147-65 (2d ed. 1977).
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Testator owns at the time the will is executed ten shares of AT&T
stock. Did he mean those specific shares or any ten shares (a gen-
eral devise)? The U.P.C. leaves that determination to the court, as
does the present Arkansas Code. 1 "s
Applicable Law
U.P.C. § 2-602
[No comparable Arkansas statute.]
This section has no exact counterpart in Arkansas or indeed in
any of the other non-U.P.C. states. The Official Comment to
U.P.C. section 2-602 notes that New York, by legislative enact-
ment, recognizes and enforces in its courts a provision in the will of
a non-domiciliary that the law of New York should govern both
real and personal property located there, and that Illinois has a
similar statute. New York would not, however, under its statute
necessarily apply the law of another state even if the testator di-
rected it. U.P.C. section 2-602 requires just that. For example, as-
sume a testator executes his will when he is a domiciliary of a par-
ticular state; he wants the will interpreted under the laws of that
state and knows he may be domiciled or have his property situated
elsewhere when he dies; his will expressly directs that it be con-
strued under the law of the designated state. If at testator's death
he is domiciled in a U.P.C. state or owns real property there, the
courts of that state would give effect to the testamentary intent.
The only limitation is that no public policy of the state be violated.
Courts could reach the same result without a specific statute, if the
Restatement is followed, 1" but courts are not likely to do so unless
the issue is competently briefed and argued by counsel familiar
with conflict of laws doctrine.
Intent of the Testator
U.P.C. § 2-603
[Although there is no separate statutory section, comparable
wording is found in several of the Arkansas sections dealing with
will construction: § 60-410; but compare § 60-409.]
The general principle embodied in the U.P.C. section is uni-
163. Cf. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 853.33 (West 1971) (requiring a gift of securities to be
construed as specific in most cases).
164. RESTATEMENT (SscoND) OF CONwUCT OF LAWS §§ 240, 264 (1971).
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versally accepted in the United States. The testator's intention
controls in the construction of his will; that intention must be
somehow expressed by the words in the will, not by oral state-
ments of the testator as to what he meant.
The real purpose of this section of the U.P.C. is to affirm that
all of the construction rules embodied in the succeeding sections
are merely presumptions and yield if the testator expresses a dif-
ferent intent. That expression need not be explicit. It is enough if
the intention is "indicated." Compare statutes which govern unless
"a contrary intention is clearly expressed." The U.P.C. wording
leaves room for the court to arrive at the actual intent of the testa-
tor if there is some wording in the will from which to arrive at that
intent. But the intent must be indicated "by the will." U.P.C. sec-
tion 2-603 does not open the door to admission of testimony as to
what the testator said to the draftsman or to others as to his in-
tent. Nevertheless, evidence of the facts surrounding preparation
and execution of the will should always be relevant in determining




Basically the above provisions are the same. The only differ-
ence is that under the U.P.C. general section a contrary intent may
be "indicated by the will" whereas under the Arkansas statute it is
necessary that the contrary intention "manifestly appears" in the
will. The difference is one of nuance which most courts would ig-
nore. Although the Arkansas statute does not contain the more
general presumption that the will passes all of testator's property
which he owns at death, modern courts use that presumption with-
out statutory base.
At early common law a devise of real property could not oper-
ate to pass after-acquired realty. Such a view of the devise has long




165. Patty v. Goolsby, 51 Ark. 61, 9 S.W. 846 (1888).
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[No comparable Arkansas Statute.]
At common law a devisee had to survive the testator in order
to take, and this is the present Arkansas rule. However, unless the
terms of the will express a requirement that the devisee survive for
a stated time, such as ninety days after the testator's death, or
until a stated event such as distribution of the estate, it is suffi-
cient that the devisee survive for only a second. The dilemma of
resolving succession when the sequence of deaths cannot be deter-
mined by available evidence (sometimes referred to as "simultane-
ous death") is met by the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, in
force in Arkansas. 16'
The U.P.C. provison goes beyond the common law rule and
requires that a devisee must survive the testator by 120 hours
(roughly five days). It parallels a comparable requirement in the
intestate succession part of the Code that a person survive a dece-
dent by 120 hours in order to take as an heir. The purpose of the
U.P.C. provision is to deal with rapid sequence of deaths, usually
arising from a common accident, which may result in double ad-
ministration of the same property and perhaps in devolution of
ownership to persons unintended by the testator. Of course, like all
the construction rules to be discussed, the careful draftsman antic-
ipates the problem and can by testamentary provision provide a
better answer to the individual client's needs and wishes. To illus-
trate the operation of the section, assume testator has a simple will
devising his estate to his wife outright. They have been married 10
years but have no children. They are involved in an auto accident,
and both fatally injured. The wife survives her husband by two
days. Under present Arkansas law she would inherit the entire es-
tate, which on her death would pass to her relatives. There would
be an administration of her husband's estate, and then the same
property would be administered again in the wife's estate with
double probate expense. Under the U.P.C. section the devise to the
wife would lapse and pass to the testator's relatives as though she
had predeceased him.
Note that the U.P.C. provision does not operate if the will
contains certain language. In some family situations involving large
estates, it may be desirable to have part of the property of one
spouse pass to the other spouse in order to qualify for the marital
166. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-124 to -129 (1971).
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deduction16" 7 even though this results in double probate expense. In
such cases it is common to provide in the will:
If my wife, -, and I die under circumstances such that there
is no sufficient evidence that we have died otherwise than simul-
taneously she shall, for purposes of this Will, be deemed to have
survived me.
Such language precludes operation of both the Uniform Simultane-
ous Death Act and U.P.C. section 2-601, as well as being permissi-
ble for tax purposes.168 A second type of clause in the will which
would override the section would be a gift to a devisee "if she sur-
vives me, but if she fails to survive me," then to another person. 6 9
Presumably the testator thought about survival and did not want
to require survival for any particular length of time. Finally, for
purposes of the marital deduction problem, it is possible to condi-
tion the marital gift upon survival for six months after the testator
and not lose the deduction;1 0 such a requirement obviously over-
rides section 6-201, but so would a simple condition that the devi-
see "survive me by one day."
If the U.P.C. is adopted, it is important to retain the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act. 7 1 It covers devolution of title in nontes-
tamentary situations, like joint tenancy and insurance. Even in the
testamentary situation, a simple will devising property to someone
"if he [she] survives me," which takes the devise out from U.P.C.
section 2-601, may present an issue of priority of death and fall
within the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act.
Oddly, U.P.C. section 2-601, unlike U.P.C. section 2-104, con-
tains no express provision for the rare case where it is known that
the devisee survived the testator, but the precise length of time of






Ark. § 60-410 (C)
167. I.R.C. § 2056.
168. Treas. Reg. § 20-2056(e)-2(e).
169. Estate of Kerlee, 98 Idaho 5, 557 P.2d 599 (1976).
170. Tress. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-3. The deduction is of course lost if the spouse fails to
survive for the required period.
171. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-124 to -130 (1971).
172. Amz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2601(B) (1975).
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At common law if a devisee died after execution of the will but
before the testator, the gift was said to "lapse"; if the devisee was
dead when the will was executed, the gift was "void." Many testa-
tors when preparing a will think in short range terms: "If I die
tomorrow, whom do I want to take my property?" The possibility
of the devisee dying before the testator ought to be considered and
an alternative or substitute gift made. The above statutes take care
of the ordinary cases where the possibility is overlooked.
Note the basic difference. The Arkansas statute is limited to
gifts to a child or grandchild of the testator, whereas the U.P.C.
section is broader and would include a devise to a brother or sister,
or a first cousin (or any other person in the category who could be
an heir in intestacy). Some statutes are even broader, encompass-
ing devises to friends.
Both statutes expressly apply to class gifts (such as devise of
property to "my children"), thereby eliminating an otherwise
troublesome problem of statutory interpretation. 17 Beyond that,
however, the U.P.C. section is more artfully drafted. It expressly
covers the "void gift" (where the devisee is dead when the will is
executed) which is technically not a lapse,17 4 and it does so even in
the case of a class gift. It also spells out the method by which issue
of the devisee take, as for example where there is a gift to a named
son who predeceases testator. Assume the son left a daughter who
survived testator and two children of a second daughter who died
before the testator, those children also surviving testator. Under
the U.P.C. the devise would go half to the surviving daughter and
one-quarter to each of the children of the deceased daughter. The
Arkansas courts might reach the same result on the wording "as if
such devisee had survived the testator and died intestate," but an
argument can be made that it would go to the daughter who
survived.175
The Arkansas statute applies "[u]nless a contrary intent is
indicated by the will." The same rule prevails under the U.P.C.
Although there is no express provision in U.P.C. section 2-605 to
that effect the general provision in U.P.C. section 2-603 is appli-
cable and is the same as the Arkansas wording. Note that a simple
addition of the words "if surviving" in the devise results in lapse
173. L. SImEs, FuTuRE INTERESTS § 104 (2d ed. 1966).
174. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 140.
175. Scholem v. Long, 246 Ark. 786, 439 S.W.2d 929 (1969).
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even though there is no alternative disposition.
Failure of Testamentary Provision
U.P.C. § 2-606
Ark. § 60-410 (a), (b)
The Arkansas and U.P.C. statutes are the same. The present
Arkansas statute was adopted in 1979 and copied from the U.P.C.
The prior statute did not deal with the case where the residue was
devised to more than one person and one of the residuary devisees
predeceased or his share failed for some other reason. In Eckhart
Heirs v. Harlow,171 a 1972 case, it was held that the residuary share
passed intestate. The above statutes reach the opposite result,
passing the share to the remaining residuary devisee or devisees.
Note that the antilapse statute might save the share for the issue
of the deceased residuary devisee under both statutes.
Ademption by Extinction
U.P.C. § 2-608
Ark. §§ 60-412, 60-414
The above statutes deal with changes in specifically devised
property after the will is executed and before the testator dies.
Suppose testator has specifically devised to her daughter described
real property in Pulaski County. Subsequently, the testator may
enter into a contract to sell the property, the property may be con-
demned, or the buildings on the property may be destroyed by fire.
At common law the property, or part of it, is no longer in the es-
tate and hence the gift has been "adeemed" or extinguished.
17
The U.P.C. attempts to ameliorate this result in certain cases.
Suppose the purchaser still owes money on the contract at the
time the testator dies; can the devisee claim the balance in place of
the real property devised to her? If the condemnation award is un-
paid, should that go to the specific devisee of the land or fall into
the residue? If the insurer of a fire policy on the building pays the
amount of the loss to the executor, should the proceeds go to the
devisee or into the residue? Under the U.P.C. the specific devisee
would win the above cases. To this extent there is nonademption.
Note, however, that the U.P.C. would not help the specific devisee
176. 251 Ark. 1018, 476 S.W.2d 244 (1972).
177. ATIaNSON, supra note 29, § 134; 6 PAGE, supra note 138, §§ 54.1 to -.37.
[Vol. 3:361
ARKANSAS AND UPC
if the purchaser (or condemnor or insurer) had made payment to
the testator during the testator's lifetime, even though the testator
believes the money will go to the devisee of the land and tells the
devisee of that intent.
Subsection (b) of the U.P.C. section 2-608 corresponds to pre-
sent Arkansas section 60-414. Both cover sale by a guardian of
property (called a "conservator" under the U.P.C.), but the U.P.C.
provision is broader: it covers the problems of condemnation
awards and insurance proceeds during guardianship. It also deals
more carefully with the case where the testator has recovered tes-
tamentary capacity at the time of his death.
The only other Arkansas statute bearing on ademption is sec-
tion 60-412. Its wording is puzzling, but it can be interpreted to
give the specific devisee the right to any unpaid part of the
purchase price. Since any right to specific performance is normally
conditioned on payment of consideration, and the statutory lan-
guage provides that the sale does not "revoke the previous devise"
(terminology used by some courts instead of "ademption"), pre-
sumably the purchaser must pay the balance on the contract to the
specific devisee and not to the personal representative under the
will. If the purchaser elects to sue for damages if the devisee re-
fuses to perform, the devisee ends up with the specifically devised
property as well as liability for any damages.
However, the Arkansas statute falls short in other situations,
as where the property has been condemned rather than sold or
where there is a casualty loss to the property. Both of those cry out
for statutory relief. Like sale by a guardian, these are situations
where the testator has done nothing to show his intent to change
the property.
It can, of course, be argued that the U.P.C. falls short of
preventing ademption in all cases, but it is a substantial improve-
ment over the present Arkansas statute. The U.P.C. also has a spe-
cial section on corporate and other securities which is in part a
nonademption statute.
Changes in Corporate Securities Specifically Devised
U.P.C. § 2-607
[No corresponding Arkansas statute.]
A specific devise of corporate securities may give rise to a vari-
ety of problems in the modern business world where nothing is
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static. Assume a specific devise of common stock in a named corpo-
ration; after the execution of the will and prior to testator's death,
the corporation may declare a stock dividend, may split the shares,
may issue stock options to the testator, may undergo a merger or
consolidation with another corporation, may be reorganized, or
may be subject to a government divestiture suit resulting in distri-
bution of holdings in another corporation. At testator's death he
may hold none of the originally devised shares but shares of an-
other entity; or he may hold the original shares plus other shares
in the same or another corporation. What passes under the original
devise? These problems have been litigated with widely varying re-
sults in the absence of statute, always at considerable expense to
the estate if the beneficiaries cannot agree. When there is no local
statute or case precedent, the personal representative is faced with
what may well be a difficult task in distributing the shares. Some
of the problems (stock splits and stock dividends) are traditionally
treated under the heading "accessions," others (the change from
shares of one corporation into shares of another) as "ademption by
extinction."
The U.P.C. provides a definite set of rules, applicable only if
the testator has not indicated a different rule by the terms of his
will. Of course, some careful draftsmen anticipate the problem of
corporate change and employ standard clauses, 178 generally similar
to the U.P.C. rules.
Note that U.P.C. section 2-607(b) excludes other distributions
prior to death. Thus cash dividends paid to the testator, even
though kept in a special account, would not pass to the specific
devisee but would be part of the residue. The same rule would gov-
ern additional shares purchased by the testator by exercising a
purchase option. Because title passes at death under the U.P.C.
section 3-101, distributions after death belong to the specific devi-
see. The same rule prevails now under Arkansas section 58-608, the
Uniform Principal and Income Act, which would be retained if the
U.P.C. were adopted. What of cash dividends received after testa-
tor's death, but declared before his death to stockholders of record
as of a date prior to death? These should be treated as distribu-
tions "prior to death." (See the Official Comment to U.P.C. section
2-607). The crucial factor is the date fixed for determination of re-
cord stockholders to whom payment is to be paid or, if no such
178. See, e.g., PRACICING LAw INSTrruTE, PRACTICAL WEL DRAM~NG 28 (2d ed. 1975).
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date is fixed, the date of declaration.' 79
The U.P.C. section is not an answer to all possible problems,
and courts should feel free to use basic common law concepts to
resolve unusual fact situations not literally within the statutory
wording. Thus courts have held there is no ademption where there
is a change in form but not substance."80 In one Arkansas case the
testator executed a will devising "all my stock and interest" in a
closely held corporation to his son and grandson; later the corpora-
tion was dissolved, but the business was carried on by the testator.
The court properly ordered distribution of the business assets to
the specific devisees in place of the stock." ' Adoption of the
U.P.C. should not change this rule. There have been similar situa-
tions where a specific devise of a partnership interest was not
adeemed where the partnership was incorporated after the execu-
tion of the will and the probate court ruled that the devise should
be construed to include the corporate stock. This, or a reverse case
where the corporation is later changed to a partnership, would not
be within the literal wording of U.P.C. section 2-607, but an analo-
gous rule should govern.
Ademption by Satisfaction
U.P.C. § 2-612
[No corresponding Arkansas statute.]
Lifetime transfers of property (usually money) to a family
member may be intended as a gift, a loan to be repaid, or as an
advance on the family member's share in the transferor's estate. If
the transfer is intended as an advance and the transferor has no
will, the transfer is treated as an "advancement"; but if the trans-
feror has a will devising property to the donee, the appropriate
legal label is "ademption by satisfaction.""182 The scope of the doc-
trine at common law was originally narrow.18
The U.P.C. section, like the parallel section on advancement
in the intestate estate, is based on the premise that in modern
179. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 58-604(e) (1971).
180. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 134; 6 PAGE, supra note 138, § 54.11.
181. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 208 Ark. 478, 187 S.W.2d 163 (1945).
182. In Blanks v. Clark, 68 Ark. 98, 56 S.W. 1063 (1900), the Arkansas Supreme Court
refers to the doctrine of "advancement" in dealing with an allegation that a specific devise
had been offset by lifetime transfers of money. The issue is one of satisfaction. The court
reached the correct result.
183. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 133; 6 PAGE, supra note 138, §§ 54.21-.37.
1980] 413
UALR LAW JOURNAL
times gifts during the donor's lifetime are not intended to affect
the donee's share in the donor's estate, whether testate or intes-
tate; and if they are so intended, the proof should be in writing.'"
Ideally the donor should revise his will or revoke or reduce the
original devise by codicil. However, the U.P.C. permits the testator
to provide for deduction of the gift by a "contemporaneous writ-
ing." The U.P.C. does not impose any formalities on that writing:
it may be a letter of transmittal or a record kept in the testator's
book of accounts. Alternatively, the donee may at any time ac-
knowledge in writing that the gift was in place of or to reduce the
devise; the acknowledgment can be after the testator's death. One
purpose of the requirement is to reduce litigation in family situa-
tions where some relatives have been given more than others dur-
ing the donor's lifetime.




Ark. §§ 62-2908; 60-413
When a testator devises specific property, is the devisee enti-
tled to the property free of any liens or encumbrances on it at the
time of his death; or does he take the property subject to the lien?
The will may resolve the problem by specific language: "I devise
my residence to my wife and direct my executor to pay off any
mortgage, lien or other encumbrance thereon at the time of my
death out of the residue of my estate" (exoneration) or "I devise
my farm to my son, subject to all liens, encumbrances and other
charges thereon" (nonexoneration). If the will contains no indica-
tion of testator's intent, which rule should govern the personal rep-
resentative? In the absence of statute most courts apply exonera-
tion of a specific devise of realty and some reach the same result
for a specific bequest of personalty."8 5
At present Arkansas follows the common law rule of exonera-
tion. The specific devisee can force the personal representative to
pay off any "secured debt" out of general assets of the estate (the
"residue"). The Committee Comment to section 62-2908 expresses
the Committee's opinion that this is "more likely" to accord with
184. See Official Comment to U.P.C. § 2-612.
185. ATKINSON, supra note 29, § 137; 6 PAGE, supra note 138, § 51.25.
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the testator's intention. Significantly, the Arkansas section applies
in intestate situations to exonerate the homestead passing to the
widow, and thus serves an important policy function of providing
for the widow. The latter problem cannot occur under the U.P.C.
intestate succession pattern which assures the surviving spouse of
all or a major share of the estate. Under the Arkansas statute it is
hard to determine when a testator has "provided otherwise" by his
will. If the specific devise is of "all of my right, title and interest in
the following real property," has he indicated an intent to devise
only his equity subject to outstanding mortgages?
The U.P.C. is based on the opposite premise that the testator
who specifically devises property thinks of that property in terms
of his "equity," i.e., subject to any mortgage or other security in-
terest. Therefore, the devisee takes subject to the mortgage. The
testator can of course provide otherwise, but a general directive to
pay debts (standard in many wills) is not enough to force exonera-
tion. If the mortgage holder files a claim and is paid out of general
assets, the personal representative must then collect from the spe-
cific devisee.
Neither the Arkansas statute nor the U.P.C. attempts to dis-
tinguish according to the time and purpose of the mortgage. Con-
sider the following situations:
(1) Testator specifically devises real property, which is subject
to a purchase money mortgage when he executes the will.
(2) Testator owns real property free of mortgage when he exe-
cutes his will specifically devising the property. Later he mort-
gages the property in order to construct improvements on it.
(3) Same, except that testator mortgages the property in order
to acquire other property which at his death is part of the
residue.
In view of the standard modern practice of mortgage-holders not
to file a claim in probate but to rely on security, and of sale "sub-
ject to mortgage," most people think of their interest in property
rather than of the land itself as the subject of the specific devise.
Hence in the first two cases nonexoneration seems to accord with
intent and fairness. In the third situation exoneration seems more
likely to be what the testator intended and results in a fair distri-
bution to both the specific devisee and the residuary devisee.
The nonexoneration rule of the U.P.C. is an easier rule to ad-
minister simply because the creditor on long-term obligations like
mortgages usually relies on his security rather than the personal
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The above sections provide for the burden of payment of
claims against the probate estate. The Arkansas section also pro-
vides for the burden of family allowances, the shares of pretermit-
ted heirs, and the elective share of the surviving spouse.1 Both
sections are copied from section 184 of the Model Probate Code, as
is most of the Arkansas Committee Comment and the U.P.C. Offi-
cial Comment. U.P.C. sections 2-301 and 2-302, dealing with the
pretermitted spouse and children, expressly provide for abatement
according to section 3-902. However, section 2-207 provides a dif-
ferent method in satisfying the elective share, namely equitable
apportionment. Allowances and exempt property under the U.P.C.
are governed by their own special rules, sections 2-401 through 2-
404, which generally follow the same abatement order as that pro-
vided in U.P.C. section 3-902, but if necessary these items take
preference over all devises as well as over unsecured claims.
Specifically devised property is used last to pay claims. As be-
tween the residuary devisee and the general devisees, the burden
falls first on the residue. A demonstrative devise (such as "$10,000
to be paid out of my savings account in X Bank") is treated as a
specific devise to the extent that there is a balance in the savings
account at the testator's death; otherwise it is a general devise.
Under both the U.P.C. and the Arkansas statutes the old English
preference for realty over personalty no longer prevails.
Subsections (b) in both the U.P.C. and the Arkansas statute
are almost identical. Here lies the potential flexibility to counter-
act the mathematical approach in subsection (a). Abatement is
necessary in estates where assets either have declined in value or
have been used up after the execution of the will, or the claims
against the estate are beyond the testator's expectations when the
will was prepared (for instance, expenses of last illness may be as-
tronomical in some cases). In one sense the testator did not foresee
the development which leaves his estate inadequate to pay claims
and still satisfy the provisions of his will. The Committee Com-
186. For the common law rules, see ArKINSON, supra note 29, § 136; 6 PAGE, supra
note 138, Ch. 53.
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ment to the Arkansas statute and the Official Comment to the
U.P.C. section both refer to preferring a general legacy to a wife or
child over other general legacies. The statutory language seems
broad enough to authorize preference of a general devise over a
specific devise, or even a residuary devise over others. Of all con-
struction problems, this one calls for more creative thought in pre-
serving the testamentary scheme. Note that the reference to "im-
plied" purpose of a devise should allow the court to explore all the
facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will.
Both Comments refer to the "probable" purpose, which comes
closer to an accurate description of what the court should try to
determine.
Related to abatement is the problem of determining the bur-
den of death taxes. U.P.C. section 3-916 incorporates the Uniform
Estate Tax Apportionment Act, originally promulgated in 1958
and revised in 1964. Arkansas, however, has a very simple statute
providing for equitable apportionment. 8 7 The difference between
the two sections is beyond the scope of this article. However, it
might be noted that under the Arkansas statute, unless the will
provides otherwise, charitable devisees must bear a portion of the
total estate tax burden even though the charitable devise itself is
deductible from the gross taxable estate; 8 8 such an unfortunate re-
sult would not be reached under the Uniform Estate Tax Appor-
tionment Act.
Intent to Exercise a Power of Appointment
U.P.C. § 2-610
[No comparable Arkansas statute.]
The increasing use of marital deduction trusts and family
trusts creating general and special testamentary powers of appoint-
ment respectively means that more testators will have a power to
appoint by will. If the donee of the power consults a skilled lawyer
to prepare his or her will, the resulting document should leave no
question as to whether the donee-testator intended to exercise the
power; the will should specifically refer to the power and expressly
state that the testator intends to exercise (or not to exercise) the
187. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 63-150 (1971).
188. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Arkansas Children's Hosp., 256 Ark. 1028, 511 S.W.2d
640 (1974). The result is that the charitable deduction itself is reduced by the amount of the
tax burden falling on the charitable bequest. I.R.C. § 2055(c).
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power. Unfortunately not all testators seek or receive competent
legal advice. In some cases the will may be prepared and executed
before the power is even created. The result may be an expensive
lawsuit to determine whether the testator intended to exercise the
power.189 This is particularly true where the power is general.
Courts have disagreed over whether a testator whose will purports
to devise "all my property at the time of my death" or "all the
rest, residue and remainder of my property of any kind" intended
thereby to include property subject to the general power. 19e On the
one hand, a power of appointment is not itself "property"; on the
other hand, a lay person is not likely to be aware of such a legalis-
tic distinction and may refer to a trust from which he or she re-
ceives all the income and which in lay terms can be disposed of by
his or her will as "my property." The need for a statute to resolve
this problem is widely recognized.119
U.P.C. section 2-610, as finally promulgated, differs from the
original draft in wording, although not so much in substance. The
Official Comment accompanying the section was designed to go
with the earlier drafts and unfortunately was not revised. However,
the Comment is still helpful. The section is based on the premise
that the donor of a general power (particularly in marital deduc-
tion trusts, which is the only place where such powers should be
used) prefers to have the property pass in default unless the donee
really intends to exercise the power. Normally, a general disposi-
tion of all the testator's property or a general residuary clause
would not be enough. Suppose, however, the testator executes a
will which expressly makes general devises exceeding individually
owned property and which therefore would be meaningless without
including the property subject to the general power of appoint-
ment. Read in light of all the circumstances, the will indicates an
intent to include the appointive property and should satisfy the
last clause of U.P.C. section 2-610.
Suppose the donee's will recites: "It is my intent to exercise
any power of appointment I may have at the time of my death."
Clearly this wording ought to exercise the power, unless the instru-
189. Undoubtedly the most litigated issue relating to powers of appointment is that of
intent of the donee to exercise the power.
190. L. Simits, Ftrruiw Irrmurs §§ 67, 68 (1966).
191. A recent article by Professor Susan French is highly recommended: Exercise of
Powers of Appointment: Should Intent to Exercise Be Inferred From a General Disposi-
tion of Property? 1979 DuKz L.J. 747. The article contains a critique of U.P.C. § 2-610.
[Vol. 3:361
ARKANSAS AND UPC
ment creating the power itself requires a reference to the specific
power (a rather common provision in marital deduction trusts).
But if the creating instrument does not require such a reference,
does the statute do so by the words: "unless specific reference is
made to the power"? Although the inclusion of the quoted words is
puzzling, the answer should be negative. First, this is an express
recital of intent to exercise any (and hence all) general powers by
the will and would be given effect under U.P.C. section 2-603. Sec-
ond, the statutory words are qualified by the alternative "or there
is some other indication of intention to include the property sub-
ject to the power."
Modern courts have struggled to give effect to the donee's in-
tent where it can be found. U.P.C. section 2-610 was not intended
to hamper that search, but rather to repudiate the minority rule
that a general residuary clause exercises a general power without
any other evidence of such intent. Suppose that the creating in-
strument contains a clause like the following: "Upon the death of
my said wife, the assets then held in the trust, or any part thereof,
including accrued and undistributed income, shall be distributed
to her appointee or appointees, including her estate, in trust, or
otherwise, as she shall appoint in her will specifically referring to
this power," and that the donee's will reads: "I give all the residue
of my property, including any over which I may have any power of
appointment to [a named devisee]." The issue in such a case is
whether the donee has met the condition imposed by the donor;
U.P.C. section 2-610 is not applicable in determining that issue.
The answer ought to be that the general wording of the residuary
clause does not satisfy the condition.
1 92
CONCLUSION
Lawyers are properly reluctant to support a change in any law
unless convinced that the new law will be an improvement. The
purpose of this article has been to provide a detailed comparison of
Article II of the U.P.C. with existing Arkansas law. The central
thesis, supported by that comparison, is that the U.P.C. will sub-
stantially improve Arkansas substantive law of intestate succes-
192. Compare In re Estate of Smith, 585 P.2d 319, 41 Colo. App. 366 (1978) and
Holzbach v. United Va. Bank, 216 Va. 482, 219 S.E.2d 868 (1975) with First Union Nat'l
Bank v. Moss, 32 N.C. App. 499, 233 S.E.2d 88 (1977) and Will of Berard, 89 Misc. 2d 838,
393 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Surr. Ct. 1977).
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sion, family protection, wills and will construction.
Some members of the Bar may oppose any change because it
makes their present knowledge obsolete and requires reeducation.
But law exists for the benefit of the public, not for the judges nor
for the legal profession who administer the law. The greater sim-
plicity of the U.P.C. and the clarity of its drafting will in the long
run benefit the profession. Experience in states which have
adopted the U.P.C. is that many lawyers who initially oppose the
U.P.C. become supporters after they become familiar with the new
provisions.
The procedural parts of the U.P.C., contained in Article III,
are in a sense more important for the administration of decedents'
estates. The authors support adoption of the entire U.P.C. Never-
theless, the substantive portions can stand alone, with selected
definitions from U.P.C. section 1-201, if it appears desirable for Ar-
kansas to consider adoption of the U.P.C. over several legislative
sessions.
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